The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction by Brown, Keith & Candeub, Adam
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2005
The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction
Keith Brown
Adam Candeub
Michigan State University College of Law, candeub@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Communications Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1463 (2005).
HeinOnline -- 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1463 2005
The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction 
Keith Brown and Adam Candeub * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Michael Powell, Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) from 2001 to 2005, will likely be most 
remembered for his controversial indecency enforcement actions 
against Howard Stern's radio show and Janet Jackson's Super Bowl 
"wardrobe malfunction."J This legacy is probably deserved. In 
addition to these high-profile enforcement actions, Michael Powell 
imposed a higher total fine amount in 2004 for broadcast indecency 
than the amount imposed during the previous ten years combined.2 
Many have alleged that Powell's enforcement actions were 
politically motivated stunts made on behalf of powerful special 
interests. 3 Some have argued that the enforcement actions have had a 
chilling effect on free speech in broadcasting.4 A few have even 
maintained that the FCC has used its licensure power to discourage 
owners of television and radio stations from challenging its indecency 
* Keith Brown is an economist at the Center for Naval Studies; Ph.D. Texas A&M; 
B.S. Trinity College. Adam Candeub is an Assistant Professor of Law at Michigan State 
University College of Law; J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Yale University. 
1. According to one trade newspaper, "'The top issue [that Powell will be remembered 
for] will be indecency, much to his chagrin,' one industry insider, who requested his name be 
withheld, told Satellite News." Editorial, FCC Chairman Michael Powell Resigns, SATELLITE 
NEWS, Jan. 31, 2005, at 1; see also Editorial, Another Powell Departs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 
2005, at A16 ("Mr. Powell's disappointing reign will be remembered for the extremes to 
which he went to punish what he called indecency .... "). 
2. John Dunbar, Indecency on the Air: Shock-Radio Jock Howard Stern Remains '"King 
of All Fines,» CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, Apr. 9, 2004, http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
telecom/report.aspx?aid=239&sid=200. 
3. See, e.g., Peter Johnson, Stern Says He'll Push for Kerry, USA TODAY, July 1, 2004, 
at D3; Editorial, Powell Overreacting to Indecency Issue, TELEVISION WEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 9. 
4. See, e.g., Daniel Rubin, Bad Words for Bono and Stern, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 19, 
2004, at A5 ("The American Civil Liberties Union said the measure would 'turn down the 
thermostat in an already chilly atmosphere, deterring speech that is constitutionally 
protected. "'); see also Mark Jurkowitz, Targeting Free Speech as Journalists Face the Courts, the 
FCC Clamps Down, and Secrecy Grows, Is the First Amendment Under Attack?, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 7,2004, at D1; Editorial, Committed to the First Amendment, BROADCASTING & 
CABLE, Oct. 24,2005, at 12. 
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actions In courtS-a Byzantine maneuver that allows congressmen 
and FCC Commissioners to continue using the indecency 
enforcement publicity that courts might otherwise stop. 
The FCC's enforcement process itself creates these problems and 
suspicions. First, because the FCC does not monitor the airwaves but 
instead relies upon citizen complaints to initiate enforcement,6 
particular interest groups can dominate enforcement even though 
indecency regulations are supposed to reflect "contemporary 
community standards.,,7 According to a recent FCC estimate 
obtained by Mediaweek, 99.9% of indecency complaints in 2003 
were filed by the Parents Television Council, an activist group with 
5. See Jeff Jarvis, Can the FCC Shut Howard Up?, NATION, May 17, 2004, at 11 
(explaining that according to "Robert Corn-Revere-the First Amendment attorney who 
recently got Lenny Bruce pardoned and who litigated against the Communications Decency 
Act .... 'The FCC has done its best to prolong the longevity of this doctrine by keeping it 
out of court'''). 
Howard Stern has often claimed that the FCC uses its power over licensure to prevent 
licensees from seeking judicial review of indecency actions. He recently repeated the claim as a 
caller on a radio show featuring Michael Powell as a guest. 
Stern: Fine after fine came and we tried to go to court with you to find out about 
obscenity and what your line was and whether our show was indecent, which I don't 
think it is. And you do something really sneaky behind the scenes. You continue to 
block Viacom from buying new stations until we pay those fines. 
You are afraid to go [sic 1 court. You are afraid to get a ruling time and time again. 
When will you allow this to go to court and stop practicing your form of 
racketeering that you do by making stations pay up or you hold up their license 
renewal? 
Powell: First of all, that's flatly false. 
Stern: You're lying. 
Ronn Owens (KGO radio broadcast Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.buzzmachine.com/ 
archives/2004_10_26.html#008280. 
In addition, many claim that the FCC sits on agency reconsideration orders for the 
purpose of delaying judicial appeal. See Stephen Labaton, Knowing Indecency Wherever He Sees 
It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at Cl ("The networks and affiliates have filed papers with the 
commission seeking a rehearing on the three major indecency cases: the Janet Jackson incident 
at the Super Bowl, Bono's use of a profanity at the Golden Globe Awards and a racy episode of 
'Married by America.' But the agency has sat on those appeals, and may not issue rulings for 
months or longer. As a practical matter, the inaction by the commission has prevented the 
networks from taking the matter to court."). 
6. Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8015 (2001) 
[hereinafter Industry Guidance 1 ("The Commission does not independently monitor 
broadcasts for indecent material. Its enforcement actions are based on documented complaints 
of indecent broadcasting received from the public."). 
7. Whether speech is indecent depends, in part, on whether it is patently offensive 
according to contemporary community standards. See infra Part II. 
1464 
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links to conservative political and religious organizations.8 As this 
Article demonstrates, increases in the number of FCC indecency 
actions have almost always been in response to political pressures 
emanating from interest groups. 
When coupled with the inherent vagueness of the indecency 
standard, the manipulatable enforcement process inevitably leads to 
claims of selective or arbitrary enforcement. It also leads to public 
choice speculation that indecency enforcement is simply a vehicle to 
allow politicians to further their own agendas.9 Or, even more darkly, 
the complaint process can be used simply as a signaling exercise 
whereby certain political groups indicate to politicians their political 
clout in order to influence issues unrelated to broadcast indecency.1O 
Further, the complaint process takes the FCC away from its stated 
purpose-claritying and rendering consistent the "community 
standards" that underlie the indecency determination. Instead, the 
FCC's complaint process has confused the standard. After nearly a 
generation of modern indecency enforcement, the standard IS 
muddier than it was thirty years ago. 
This Article sets forth a new, market-based approach to 
indecency regulation designed to avoid many of these problems and 
to permit the emergence of decency standards that more accurately 
reflect those of the community. Drawing on recent economic theory 
involving two-sided markets, we propose a new market-based 
mechanism for indecency regulation that avoids the pitfalls of the 
FCC's current politicized approach. Instead of focusing regulations 
on the broadcaster, this Article advocates shifting the current 
regulatory scheme to market-based regulation of the viewer-
advertiser relationship. Specifically, this Article proposes that the 
8. Todd Shields, Activists Dominate Content Complaints, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 6, 2004, 
at 4. ("Through early October, 99.9% of indecency complaints-aside from those concerning 
the Janet Jackson 'wardrobe malfunction' during the Super Bowl halftime show broadcast on 
CBS-were brought by the PTC, according to the FCC analysis dated Oct. 1."). 
9. Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, in 6 SUPREME COURT 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 173,176 (Ernest Gellhorn & Nelson Lund eds., 1998). ("The theory of 
public choice, also known as the economic theory of legislation, makes the sarri.e basic 
assumptions about self· interest for politicians and bureaucrats that standard economic analysis 
makes for private sector actors .... [M]arket forces provide strong incentives for self-interested 
politicians to enact laws that serve private rather than public interests because ... these private 
groups can provide politicians and bureaucrats with the political support they need to serve 
their objectives of achieving re-election, or of maximizing their bureaucratic turf."). 
10. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 765,777 (1998). 
1465 
HeinOnline -- 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1466 2005
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW [2005 
FCC require all programs to explicitly state the entities that advertise 
with them and make that information easily accessible to consumers. 
This approach would allow consumers to directly pressure 
advertisers-who, in turn, could pressure broadcasters to air 
acceptable programming. This mechanism would better reflect 
community standards and encourage viewers to engage in a 
meaningful civic dialogue. The proposed regulation would also 
enhance economic efficiency, a new justification for media regulation 
not before considered by scholars.ll 
This Article's analysis questions the completeness of the currently 
dominant legal justification for indecency regulation, the public 
trustee doctrine. As set forth by both the Supreme Court and the 
FCC over approximately the last seventy years, "the People" own the 
airways, and they, through their elected officials and delegated 
agencies, condition the granting of licenses to use the airways. 12 
Consequently, broadcasters are public trustees of the people's 
airways. In exchange for the right to use the airways, broadcasters 
must adhere to the obscenity and indecency standards the FCC 
promulgates. 13 
We argue instead that regulation must focus on advertisers 
because they drive media markets. Broadcasters make their money 
from advertising: the more viewers or listeners (a.k.a. "eyeballs") 
they deliver to advertisers, the more broadcasters can charge 
advertisers. The real economIC transaction IS not between 
11. See, e.g., Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 990 (1989) (setting forth the scarcity, public trustee, and industry structure 
justifications for media regulation). 
12. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,394 (1969) ("Licenses to broadcast do 
not confer ownership of designated frequencies .... "); THOMAS G. KRATI'ENMAKER & LUCAS 
A. POWE, JR., REGUIATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 157 n.54 (1994) ("[S]tations 
operating under Government license are trustees of property, this property to be used for the 
benefit of the public." (quoting Federal Radio Commission, THIRD ANNUAL REp. 31 
(1929))). Or, as Senator Clarence Dill, a sponsor of the epochal 1927 Radio Act stated, "Of 
one thing I am absolutely certain. Uncle Sam should not only police this 'new beat'; he should 
see to it that no one uses it who does not promise to be good and well-behaved." C.c. Dill, A 
Traffic Cop for the Air, 75 AM. REv. REvs. 181, 181 (1927). 
The "public trustee" basis for broadcast regulation is certainly not the only one used by 
the Supreme Court and the FCC over the years; they have used others-most notably 
scarcity-but also industry structure, access, and the protection of children. See Spitzer, supra 
note 11. Nonetheless, the public trustee justification is one of the earliest justifications, and it 
has never been abandoned. 
13. For discussion of the development and history of the quid pro quo, see infra Part 
II.A. 
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broadcasters and consumers as the traditional regulatory framework 
assumes. Rather, consumers trade the value of their time watching 
commercials in exchange for programming. If FCC regulation takes 
into account both transactions, "eyeball owners" will be able to 
better bargain with their advertisers in order to gain a more direct 
voice in determining programming content in return for listening to 
their commercials. 
By collecting and furnishing information in an easily accessible 
way about what programs advertisers support, the FCC could lower 
the transaction costs for viewers to communicate with or possibly put 
pressure on firms that advertise on indecent programming. This 
viewer-based mechanism would better reflect "community 
standards" than the FCC's one-size-fits-all approach, which attempts 
to impose a national indecency standard based on interest-group 
complaints. A market approach also allows for localized 
determinations of indecency. Finally, by gathering information on 
advertisers and making it public, the FCC's role would be analogous 
to that of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in ensuring the 
accuracy of food labeling for the purpose of informing public debate. 
Both programs have demonstrated efficiency gains by providing 
information to consumers. 
Section II of this Article introduces the current state of the law 
and regulation on broadcast indecency. Section III examines the 
statutory history of indecency regulation and its judicial 
interpretation in an effort to understand why enforcement has always 
concentrated on the viewer-broadcaster relationship. Section IV 
examines the modern history of indecency enforcement and argues 
that indecency regulations, as currently designed, are an invitation 
for arbitrary, partisan enforcement. The basic structure of indecency 
enforcement and its focus on the viewer-broadcaster relationship, 
with the FCC purporting to act on behalf of the viewer, is arguably 
the cause for this faulty enforcement. Section V introduces the 
theory of the two-sided market and explains its application to 
broadcasting regulation. The Section goes on to examine the FCC's 
authority for imposing a viewer-advertiser regulation regime. It 
argues that, due to the nature of media markets, the market acting 
alone may not provide an optimal level of information. It also 
explains how this proposal might work with or without the current 
regulatory regime. Section V concludes by arguing that this new 
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approach builds civil society because it provides information for 
public discussion about matters of interest to society as a whole. 
II. CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS AND THE COMPLAINT PROCESS 
The following summarizes the existing legal standards for 
broadcast decency established in statute, Supreme Court precedent, 
agency regulations, and the FCC's enforcement process. 
The FCC derives the authority to assess civil forfeitures (fines) 
against broadcasters from § 1464 of Title 18 of United States 
Criminal Code, pursuant to its own complaint process for indecent 
material. 14 In relevant part, this statute states, "Whoever utters any 
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio 
communication shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.,,15 
The FCC's regulation of indecent broadcast was upheld despite a 
First Amendment challenge in FCC v. Paciftca. 16 This famous case 
arose after a radio station's daytime broadcast of comedian George 
Carlin's "Seven Filthy Words" monologue. 17 The Court concluded 
that speech transmitted over broadcast media, like television and 
radio, has only limited First Amendment protection. Therefore, the 
FCC could constitutionally regulate indecent speech in the broadcast 
context even though indecent speech is not obscene and thus devoid 
of constitutional protections. IS The Court described indecency as 
"nonconformance with accepted standards of morality,,,19 involving 
"patently offensive reference to excretory and sexual organs and 
activities.,,2o The Court did concede, however, that the concept of 
indecency "requires consideration of a host of variables. ,,21 The 
Court permitted this lower level of First Amendment protection to 
speech uttered on broadcast for two reasons: the uniquely pervasive 
14. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F .2d 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(holding that the FCC has authority to sanction licensees for broadcast of indecent material). 
15'. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). Obscene material is prohibited from being broadcast as it 
has no constitutional protection. The U.S. Department of Justice prosecutes transmission of 
obscene materials. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. llS (1989); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
16. 438 U.S. 726,727-28 (1978). 
17. Id. at 728-29. 
18. Id. at 739-41. 
19. Id.at740. 
20. Id. at 743. 
21. Id. at 750. 
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presence that radio and television occupy in the lives of people and 
the unique ability of children to access radio and television 
broadcasts. 22 
Section 73.3999 of the Code of Federal Regulations states, "No 
licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall broadcast ... 
any material which is indecent. ,,23 The FCC currently defines 
indecency as "language or material that, in context, depicts or 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory 
activities or organs. ,,24 The FCC uses a community standard that is 
not region-specific but rather one that reflects the views of "an 
average broadcast viewer or listener" in the United States. The FCC 
considers the allegedly indecent utterance in context.25 In making its 
indecency determinations, the Commission relies on three factors: 
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or 
depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether 
the material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions or sexual or 
excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears to 
pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material appears to 
have been presented for its shock value.26 
The FCC does not monitor broadcasts for indecent material. 
There are no bureaucrats on the federal payroll watching television 
all day looking for "sexual or excretory organs." Rather, the FCC 
relies on complaints received from members of the public. These 
complaints must include a tape of the offending program, the date 
and time of the broadcast, and the call sign of the station involved. 27 
Generally, the Enforcement Bureau of the FCC will make a 
recommendation and decide on an appropriate disposition, which 
might include denial of the complaint, issuance of a Letter of Inquiry 
seeking further information, issuance of a Notice of Apparent 
Liability (NAL) for monetary forfeiture, or a formal referral to the 
22. Id. at 748-50. 
23. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004). 
24. Industry Guidance, supra note 6, at 7999, 8000 (citing Enforcement of 
Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,8 F.C.C.R. 704 n.l0 (1993)). 
25. Id. at 8002-03. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 8015. 
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FCC Commissioners.28 If the Enforcement Bureau issues an NAL, 
the licensee is allowed to respond. The FCC may then impose a 
monetary penalty by issuing a forfeiture order.29 If a forfeiture order 
is issued, a licensee may seek reconsideration from the FCC or refuse 
to pay the fine and challenge the order directly in district court.30 
III. HISTORY OF THE INDECENCY PROHIBITION AND ITS 
UNDERLYING AsSUMPTIONS ABOUT MEDIA 
MARKETS AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
This Section recounts the history of indecency regulation and 
enforcement to show how and why the assumptions upon which 
indecency regulation was based naturally focused the regulator on 
the broadcaster-viewer relationship. & the preceding discussion 
suggests, the FCC has been unable to create a coherent standard for 
enforcing indecency. This failure stems from the public trustee 
assumption in the enforcement of indecency standards: acting at the 
behest of the viewer, the FCC attempts to determine what indecency 
is and then applies these standards against the broadcaster. & a 
result, the FCC's effort to define indecency is easily politicized. This 
Section attempts to understand why the FCC's enforcement of 
indecency regulations fixed its gaze only on the viewer and 
broadcaster. 
A. The Radio Act of 1912 
The Radio Act of 191231 represented Congress's first foray into 
federal broadcast regulation. It was passed to satisfY America's 
obligations under international treaty regarding ship, marine ship-to-
shore, and ship-to-ship radios32-an issue that became particularly 
28. Id. This procedure purports to be driven by the action of the Enforcement Bureau, 
which is staffed by career bureaucrats, although political appointees sometimes commandeer 
the procedure. See, e.g., Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their 
Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,4980 (2004) (overriding 
career staff's decision). There are currently five FCC Commissioners. Typically, three of these 
belong to the party of the President; the other two belong to the opposing party. See Federal 
Communications Commission, About the FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2005). 
29. Industry Guidance, supra note 6, at 8016. 
30. Id. 
31. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302. 
32. Id. The International Wireless Telegraph Convention required the United States "to 
apply the provisions of the present Convention to all wireless telegraph stations open to public 
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pressing due to the role that radio signaling confusion played in the 
sinking of the Titanic. 33 The Act established federal authority to 
regulate the airways.34 Although the Act did not declare federal 
"ownership" of the airways, it established that broadcasting was a 
privilege requiring federal permission. 35 Anyone with a radio 
transmitter-from commercial stations to high school physics club 
members-could transmit provided she sent a postcard to the 
Secretary of Commerce.36 The Secretary lacked discretionary 
authority and had to issue a license to anyone who met the statutory 
standards, which were minimal. 37 As Thomas Hazlett wrote, "The 
federal government was asserting ownership of the electromagnetic 
resource, but in a rather peculiar way: the secretary took no payment 
and issued no exclusive frequency rights. ,,38 
Strikingly, despite the almost commons management of the radio 
spectrum under the Radio Act of 1912, the government still 
required that users of the radio spectrum uphold decency standards. 
Thus, even at the very infancy of federal ownership of the airwaves, . 
the government demanded decency standards, quid pro quo. In 
1914, the Department of Commerce published a pamphlet entitled 
"Radio Communication Laws of the United States.,,39 Regulation 
service between the cost and vessels at sea." Art. 1, 27 Stat. 1565. See DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING 14 (Frank J. Kahn ed., 4th ed. 1984) (1969). 
33. See KRArrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 5-7 (detailing the Titanic disaster 
and the subsequent genesis of broadcast regulation). 
34. See THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF 
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 78 (1996) (noting that the 1912 Act 
first asserted the principle of federal limitations on spectrum access and characterized radio 
transmissions as a privilege sanctioned by the government). 
35. 37 Stat. 302. 
36. Mark Goodman, Radio Act of 1927 as a Product of Progressivism, 2 MEDIA HIST. 
MONOGRAPHS 2 (1999), available at htt:/ /www.scripps.ohiou.edu/mediahistory/ 
mhmjour2-2.htm. According to the New York Times, there were 733 public entertainment 
stations and 18,119 amateur radio sending stations in operation in 1927. Hoover To Maintain 
Radio Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,1927, at 2. 
37. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1925) ("It logically 
follows that the duty of issuing licenses to persons or corporations coming within the 
classification designated in the act reposes no discretion whatever in the Secretary of 
Commerce. The duty is mandatory; hence the courts will not hesitate to require its 
performance."). 
38. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of u.s. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 
33 ].L. & ECON. 133,135 (1990). 
39. Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, The Origins of the Ban on Obscene, Indecent or Profane 
Language of the Radio Act of 1927, 149 JOURNALISM & MAss COMM. MONOGRAPHS 1, 7 
(1995). 
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210 stated, "No person shall transmit or make a signal contammg 
profane or obscene words or language. ,,40 According to historian 
Rivera-Sanchez, "It is not clear where this regulation came from.,,41 
Apparently this regulation was enforced, although the extent of 
enforcement is unclear.42 By the standards of the Howard Stern 
Show, these complaints were generally tame. For instance, in 1920, 
amateur licensee Edgar Ferguson received a warning that his license 
would be suspended for three months if he continued to use the 
profane phrase "go to hell" on the air.43 On the other hand, a 
transmission between two sailors discussing the comparative services 
available from prostitutes at several ports would be racy by twenty-
first century standards.44 It should be noted that all recorded 
examples of enforcement involved point-to-point communications, 
as opposed to broadcast content intended for a mass audience.45 
Rivera-Sanchez speculated that "[t]he scarcity of documented 
complaints about the use of offensive speech in radio broadcasting 
may have been the result of broadcasters' respect for their 
heterogeneous audience. ,,46 
B. Passage of the 1927 Radio Act and the Federal Radio Commission 
1. Broadcast regulation prior to the 1927 Radio Act 
Throughout the 1920s, the country experienced the rapid 
growth of radio broadcasts. By 1922 there were 576 broadcast 
stations, and the numbers increased throughout the decade.47 Of 
course, when price is zero, demand is infinite. In industry and 
Washington policy circles, the fear became rampant that the airways 
had became a Tower of Babe1.48 For instance, a commentator in the 
industry magazine Radio Broadcast wrote, "Freedom of the air does 
not require that everyone who wishes to impress himself on the radio 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 8. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 10. 
46. Id. 
47. Hazlett, supra note 38, at 139. 
48. See ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1966). 
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audience need have his private microphone to do so. ,,49 He added, 
"Radio waves cannot be freely used by everyone. Unlimited use will 
lead to its destruction. ,,50 
Herbert Hoover, already an internationally known figure due to 
his relief work in Europe after the First World War, was serving as 
Secretary of Commerce at the time. An engineer by training, he 
realized the importance, power, and potential of commercial 
broadcasting. He "remolded the Radio Act from its origins and 
emphasis on wireless point-to-point telegraphy to one that fostered a 
wider use of the newly emerging technology.,,51 His problem was 
that the 1912 Act did not give him sufficient power to impose 
restrictions on broadcasts or even reallocate the spectrum. 
Hoover initiated radio conferences in 1922, 1923, 1924, and 
1925 for the purpose of creating consensus on the technical and 
policy aspects of radio regulation.52 Attracting industry leaders, 
political figures, and technical experts, each of these conferences set 
forth plans for more comprehensive regulation of the airwaves and 
proposed draft legislation to enact these plans. 53 Unfortunately, these 
well-considered plans did not prompt Congress to act. 
Perhaps sensing that mere conferencing would not bring 
congressional action, Hoover precipitated events. Several federal 
court decisions also helped push the need for broadcast regulation to 
Congress's attention. In 1923, the D.C. Court of Appeals, in Hoover 
v. Intercity Radio Co., made clear that the Secretary of Commerce 
did not have the authority to withhold a license from a qualified 
applicant but could only select times and wavelengths to minimize 
broadcast interference.54 Despite the ruling, Hoover continued to 
refuse certain applications for radio licenses. 55 In a 1926 decision, 
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.,56 a United States district court 
further limited the Secretary of Commerce's power, ruling that he 
lacked the authority both to refuse to issue licenses and to select 
times when broadcasters could broadcast. 
49. J.H. Morecraft:, The March of Radio, RADIO BROADCAST, Apr. 1926, at 555. 
50. Id. at 475. 
51. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 7. 
52. Id. at 8-11. 
53. Id. 
54. 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
55. KRA TTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 11. 
56. 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). 
1473 
HeinOnline -- 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1474 2005
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW [2005 
In reaction to Zenith, Hoover refused to regulate broadcast and 
essentially ended all licensing by the Department of Commerce.57 
This inaction produced a crisis.58 No new licenses were issued, and 
no regulations were issued to address interference concerns. This 
forced Congress to act, which is what Hoover and the radio industry 
wanted. 59 As a result, President Calvin Coolidge signed the Radio 
Act of 1927, which gave the newly established Federal Radio 
Commission (FRC) the authority to assign and revoke radio 
licenses.6o 
2. Ownership assumptions underlying the Radio Act of 1927 
With the Radio Act of 1927, Congress made clear that use of 
spectrum was quid pro quo: Broadcasters could use their assigned 
spectrum in exchange for fulfilling their "public interest" obligation. 
The contemporary meaning of public interest was rather vague. 
Senator Dill, the author of the Act, said perhaps hyperbolically, that 
the public interest "covers just about everything. ,,61 Regardless of the 
exact parameters of public interest, it was clear that Congress 
expected something in return for the privilege of broadcasting. 
The notion that government owned the air and had a right to 
demand a quid pro quo for usage was well established in the Act 
itself and in the discussion surrounding it. At the November 1925 
Radio Conference, Hoover stated, 
Some of our major decisions of policy have been of far-reaching 
importance and have justified themselves a thousand-fold. The 
decision that the public, through the Government, must retain the 
ownership of the channels through the air with just as zealous a 
care for open competition as we retain public ownership of our 
navigation channels has given freedom and development in service 
that would have otherwise been lost in private monopolies.62 
Fundamentally, the Act "bluntly declared that there could be no 
private ownership of the airwaves; they were public and use could 
57. KRA TfENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 11. 
58. Id. at 12. 
59. Id. at 7-16; Hazlett, supra note 38, at 159. 
60. Radio Act ofl927, Pub. L. No. 69-632,44 Stat. 1162. 
61. KRATfENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 20. 
62. C.M. Jansky, Jr., The Contribution of Herbert Hoover to Broadcasting, 1 J. BROAD. 
241,248 (1957). 
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occur only with the government's permission."63 Maine 
Congressman Wallace White, a sponsor of the 1927 Act, expressed 
the typical view that 
[ w]e have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all of 
our people to enjoy this means of communication can be preserved 
only by the repudiation of the idea underlying the 1912 law that 
anyone who will may transmit and by the assertion in its stead of 
the doctrine that the right of the public to service is superior to the 
right of any individual to use the ether.64 
Senator Dill stated, "The one principle regarding radio that must 
be adhered to, as basic and fundamental, is that the Government 
must always retain complete and absolute control of the right to use 
the air. ,,65 A contemporary commentator asserted that the idea that 
the government "owns the ether" was an idee fixe in the 
congressional debate.66 According to Powe and Krattenmaker, 
Although the 1912 Act had required a license to use the air, it had 
been silent on the issue of ownership of the airwaves. The 1927 Act 
was not. It bluntly declared that there could be no private 
ownership of the airwaves; they were public and use could occur 
only with the government's permission.67 
Interestingly, prior to passage of the Act, Congress enacted a 
measure designed to ensure that no private entity could claim private 
ownership over any portion of the airwaves. Senate Joint Resolution 
125, signed by President Coolidge, required that any applicant for a 
license or license renewal had to "execute in writing a waiver of any 
right or any claim to any right, as against the United States, to any 
wave length or to the use of the ether in radio transmission because 
of previous license to use the same or because of the use thereof. ,,68 
As Powe and Krattenmaker highlight, broadcasters were involved 
in a quid-pro-quo exchange. Hoover understood that in exchange 
for a license, the government would want something in return: "[I]t 
becomes of primary public interest to say who is to do the 
broadcasting, under what circumstances, and with what type of 
63. KRATIENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 12 (citing 44 Stat. 1162 (1927)). 
64. 69 CONGo &Be. H5479 (1926). 
65. Dill, supra note 12, at 184. 
66. Note, Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L.J. 245, 250 (1929). 
67. KRATIENMAKER&POWE, supra note 12, at 12 (citing 44 Stat. 1162). 
68. S,J. Res. 125, 69th Cong., 44 Stat. 917 (1926). 
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material.,,69 Congressman White stated that the Radio Act of 1912 
allowed an individual to "demand a license whether he will render 
service to the public there under or not.,,70 The 1927 Act, however, 
created a requirement of public service in exchange for a license.71 
Finally, in 1928, the Federal Radio Commission concisely 
characterized the right to broadcast as a quid pro quo. Its second 
annual report stated that "the Commission must determine from 
among the applicants before it which of them will, if licensed, best 
serve the public .... Those who give the least, however, must be 
sacrificed for those who give the most.,,72 
C. Obscenity) Indecency) and the Public Interest Standard 
Section 28 of the 1927 Act included prohibitions against the 
broadcast of obscene, indecent, and profane speech. Congress 
empowered the newly formed FRC to prosecute "whoever utters any 
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio 
communication."73 Adopting the recommendations of the Fourth 
National Radio Conference in 1925, the Act further stated that 
[n]othing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the 
licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio 
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no 
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the 
licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free 
speech by means of radio communications.74 
This statutory juxtaposition between prohibitions on certain 
types of speech next to sections prohibiting censorship seems jarring. 
Arguably, the language simply reflects a different historical mindset. 
At the time, censorship had a more proscribed meaning that focused 
on government review of political speech.7s That the statute's 
framers did not view restrictions on obscenity, indecency, and 
69. KRATIENMAKER & POWE, SZlpra note 12, at 19 (citing Daniel E. Garvey, Secretary 
Hoover and the Questfor Broadcast Regulation, 3 JOURNALISM HIST. 66, 67 (1976)). 
70. Wallace H. White, Unscrambling the Ether, LITERARY DIGEST, Mar. 5, 1927, at 7. 
71. Id. 
72. Statement of the Commission, Aug. 23, 1928, reprinted in FEDERAL RADIO 
COMMISSION, SECONDfu'1N. REp. 166,170 app. F (1928). 
73. 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-83 (repealed 1934). 
74. Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). 
75. David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of 
Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REv. 47, 55-67 (1992). 
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profanity as censorship probably reflected an unstated societal 
consensus that constitutional protections should be exercised only 
within the confines of public propriety. Indeed, in the 1910s and 
1920s, only the minority view-often expressed in Supreme Court 
dissents-held that the First Amendment barred censorship of 
expression.76 
To those involved in the Act's passage, the obscenity, indecency, 
and profanity language probably seemed like a natural extension of 
the public-interest standard. Senate sponsor Senator Dill stated, "Of 
one thing I am absolutely certain. Uncle Sam should not only police 
this 'new beat'; he should see to it that no one uses it who does not 
promise to be good and well-behaved.,,77 This position was clear to 
those who first supported radio regulation. For instance, in Herbert 
Hoover's address to the Third Radio Conference of 1924, he stated: 
Through the policies we have established the Government and 
therefore the people, have today the control of the channels 
through the ether just as we have control of our channels of 
navigation .... We will maintain them free ... but we must also 
maintain them free of malice and unwholesomeness.78 
Perhaps due to the unstated societal consensus that free speech 
over broadcast had to exist within standards of propriety, the 
indecency sections were mentioned only in passing in the legislative 
history.79 For instance, in Pacifica, the Supreme Court made much 
of the legislative silence on section 28 of the 1927 Act, stating that 
the obscenity and decency provision "was discussed only in 
generalities when it was first enacted. "so To some degree, this 
legislative silence justified the Pacifica Court's willingness to craft its 
own definition of indecency as a concept separate and distinct from 
"obscenity. " 
An analysis of contemporaneous statutes and draft legislation 
suggests that the Pacifica Court was incorrect when it defined 
indecency and obscenity differently. Statutes on the books 
76. See, eg., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding conviction for 
distributing leaflets critical of the United States and its war policies). Justice Holmes dissented, 
arguing that the First Amendment rendered unconstitutional the statute under which the 
defendants were convicted and urged a "free trade in ideas." Id. at 630. 
77. Dill, supra note 12, at 181. 
78. Jansky, supra note 62, at 248. 
79. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,738 (1978). 
80. Id. 
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contemporaneously with the Act use obscenity and indecency 
synonymously. For instance, the Comstock Act of 1872 prohibited 
the mailing of obscene materials.8l It read, "[N]o obscene book, 
pamphlet, picture, print, or other publication of a vulgar or indecent 
character . . . shall be carried in the mail . . . . ,,82 Early court 
decisions interpreting the Comstock Act did not distinguish 
obscenity from indecency.83 For example, a federal court in Indiana 
stated that indecency was a general category encompassing 
obscenity.84 Further, the 1912 Act and the 1914 Commerce 
Department regulations prohibited "obscene and profane" 
utterances without distinguishing between the twO.85 
Milagros Rivera-Sanchez suggests that the 1927 Radio Act 
language was largely lifted from the Commerce Department 
pamphlet of 1914, Regulation 210 discussed above.86 The First 
Radio Conference produced a draft radio bill dated April 18, 1922; 
section 3(E)( e) of the document states that an operator's license 
shall be suspended if he "has transmitted superfluous signals, or 
signals containing profane or obscene words or language. ,,87 This 
language exactly matches the Commerce Department pamphlet. 
When Senator Clarence Dill introduced H.R. 9971, however, he 
"inverted the order of the terms profane and obscene and added the 
word 'indecent. ",88 There is no stated reason why Senator Dill did 
this and thus very little one can conclude about the significance of 
the revision. This version with slight changes was adopted into the 
1927 Act. 
This interesting historical footnote suggests that the Pacifica 
opinion was probably incorrect in claiming that indecency and 
obscenity referred to different concepts. Certainly, there is no 
evidence that the statute's drafters thought the two words had 
distinct meanings. Rather, the evidence, slim as it is, suggests that 
81. 17 Stat. 283 § 148 (Jun. 8, 1872). 
82. [d. 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930); Parmelee v. United 
States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940). 
84. United States v. Males, 51 F. 41 (D. Ind. 1892). 
85. Rivera-Sanchez, supra note 39, at 19. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. at 20. 
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the congressmen envisioned prohibitions on one unitary category of 
inappropriate speech. 
D. The 1934 Act and the Federal Communications Commission 
Dissatisfied with the FRC, President Roosevelt sought to create a 
federal agency with power over both wire and radio companies. After 
considerable wrangling over whether spectrum would be allocated to 
nonprofit and special interest groups, Congress passed the 1934 
Communications Act.89 It established the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and transferred authority over spectrum 
decisions from the FRC to the FCC. The radio provisions in Title III 
of the new Act were essentially the same as those in the 1927 Act, 
thus affirming the government ownership of all broadcasting rights 
and the public trustee concept.90 
The 1934 Act also adopted the 1927 Act's obscenity, indecency, 
and profanity language, largely verbatim.91 There was little legislative 
history discussing the incorporation of such language into the new 
legislation. The ban on obscene, indecent, and profane language was 
amended in 1948 and replaced with criminal penalties for using such 
language over the airwaves. The modified clause was struck from the 
Communications Act and incorporated into the Criminal Code 
where it is found today.92 Despite the recodifications, the language 
remains largely identical today.93 
E. Conclusion 
The obscenity and indecency prohibitions emerge from a legal 
paradigm that sees the broadcaster and the government involved in 
an exchange. The broadcaster gets, from the people through the 
FCC, a right to use or license; in exchange, the people receive from 
the broadcaster the promise to act as a trustee in the public interest. 
The FCC enforces the agreement. From the very inception of radio, 
89. Robert D. Richards, Resurrecting the Fairness Doctrine: The Quandary of 
Enforcement Continues, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 557,660 (1989). 
90. Id. 
91. Section 29 of the 1927 Radio Act was incorporated to the 1934 Communications 
Act at section 326. 
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1948). 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communications shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than two years, or both."). 
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the trustee responsibilities included the obligation to adhere to 
indecency and obscenity prohibitions. In this way, the broadcasters 
became part of the quid pro quo. 
Thus, the entire thrust of the regulatory system has focused on 
the broadcaster and its obligations towards the listener/viewer with 
the FCC as enforcer. This analysis ignores the relationship between 
the viewer and the advertiser and the ways this relationship can be 
included in the regulatory structure. The next Section analyzes the 
skewed outcomes that arise, in part, because regulatory focus is on 
the broadcaster-viewer relationship. 
IV. ENFORCEMENT ACTION 
The eXlstmg legal structure for regulating indecency leads to 
politicized enforcement, which plurs legal standards and chills free 
expression. In general, FCC action against broadcast indecency has 
been sporadic, intensifying during the administrations of Republican 
Presidents, particularly Richard Nixon and George W. Bush, who 
typically acted in response to pressure from social conservative 
groups. This politicized pattern of enforcement has had little to do 
with defining or clarifying either community standards of indecency 
or the constitutional standard in Pacifica, which should control the 
FCC's indecency enforcement actions. 
A. Early Enforcement Under the 1934 Act 
The first notable FCC indecency action under the 1934 
Communications Act94 followed a pattern that seems remarkably 
contemporary: a famous entertainer gave a performance that pushed 
the envelope of accepted morality. Politicians fulminated, and the 
FCC reacted. 
In a 1937 NBC radio broadcast, the famous Mae West, playing a 
rather provocative Eve, gave a slightly salacious radio performance 
spoofing the Garden of Eden.95 Responding to a significant public 
94. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2000). The 1934 Act created the FCC and gave it 
enforcement authority over broadcast. Id. § lSI. 
95. The Chase and Sanbourn Hour: Adam & Eve (NBC radio broadcast Dec. 12, 1937). 
The program described West approaching a "palpitatin' python," (played by Edgar Bergman-
although some sources credit Ted Osborn with the role) and sending the snake to get an apple 
for her, leading to this exchange: 
SNAKE: I'll-I'll do it (hissing laugh) 
EVE: Now you're talking. Here-right between those pickets. 
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SNAKE: I'm-I'm stuck. 
EVE: Oh, shake your hips. There, there now, you're through. 
SNAKE: I shouldn't be doing this. 
EVE: Yeah, but you're doing all right now. Get me a big one ... I feel like doin' a 
big apple . .. Mmm-oh ... nice goin', swivel hips. 
Forty million people tuned into the show. According to historical reports, many found the 
dialogue to be highly amusing, but there were also several thousand complaints. 
Oddly, a feature appearing a few minutes later on the program, introduced by Don 
Ameche as "the romantic battle of the century between Siren Mae West and Casanova Charlie 
McCarthy," featured West and Charlie McCarty engaged in a steamy dialogue-but did not 
elicit the same outrage. 
Or: 
MAE: Nothin' I like better than the smell of burn in' wood! 
CHARLIE: Wonder if she means me? 
DON: Better watch out, Charlie! 
BERGEN: Say, Charlie-do you smell that perfume? Isn't it ravishing? 
CHARLIE: Yeah! Yes it is-it's ravishing! It's weakening! So help me-I'm 
swooooooning! Wooo wooo woooo! What is it? 
MAE: Whyyyyy, it's my favorite perfume: "Ashes of Men." 
CHARLIE: Uh-oh! "Ashes of Men?" Holy smoke! She's not gonna make a 
cinder ... outa me!" 
MAE: Listen, Charlie-are these your keys? 
CHARLIE: Oh, uhhhh, thanks Mae-did I leave them in the car? 
MAE: No-you left 'em in my apartment! 
(Bergen is outraged to learn of Charlie's nocturnal activities-but Mae rises to his 
defense.) 
MAE: If you wanna know, he did come up to see mc. 
BERGEN: Oh, he did? And what was he doing up there? 
MAE: Wellll ... Charlie came up, and I showed him my ... etchings. And he 
showed me his ... stamp collection. 
BERGEN: Oh, so that's all there was to it--etchings and a stamp collection! 
CHARLIE: Heh, heh, heh-he's so naive! 
And more: 
MAE: I thought we were going to have a nice long talk Tuesday night at my 
apartment! Where did you go when the doorbell rang? 
CHARLIE: I was gonna hide in your clothes closet-but two guys kicked me out! 
And, of course: 
BERGEN: Tell me, Miss West-have you ever found the one man you could love? 
MAE: Sure ... lotsa times! 
As the dialogue proceeds, recordings of the program show a certain nervousness in the 
response of the audience-there is a marked edginess to the laughter, which only becomes 
more pronounced as the routine nears its climax: 
MAE: You ain't afraid that I'd do ya wrong? Orrrr ... are ya afraid that I'll do ya 
right? 
CHARLIE: Well, I'm slightly confused. I need time for that one. 
MAE: That's all right-I like a man what takes his ... time! Why doncha come up 
home with me now, honey? I'll let ya play in my ... woodpile. (A very nervous 
laugh from the audience is audible on this line.) 
But Charlie won't give in, and Mae finally gives him the brush-off: 
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outcry, Representative Lawrence Connery (D-MA) complained on 
the House floor of "the ravishing of the American home" by West's 
"foul, sensuous, indecent, and blasphemous radio program," which 
"reduced the Garden of Eden episode to the very lowest level of 
bawdy-house stuff. ,,96 The FCC responded with a stern warning to 
NBC, and NBC banned West and even the mention of her name.97 
Excepting the Mae West incident, FCC power to regulate 
broadcast content was largely unused from the 1930s to the 1960s, 
with no notable actions for broadcast indecency during this time. 
Marjorie Heins stated that "[FCC] power lay largely dormant in the 
1950s.,,98 A legal commentator wrote in a 1959 Harvard Law 
Review article that "[ t ]he federal statutes which make it criminal to 
broadcast obscenity ... have ... been almost completely ignored. ,,99 
This temporary abeyance stemmed from social and political, as 
well as legal, causes. Many believe that the 1950s were a time of 
tremendous conformity and cultural conservatism, and the broadcast 
media simply responded to these strong cultural conventions. 100 
Indeed, the few indecency complaints filed and acted upon during 
this period appear remarkably tame by current standards. For 
instance, the FCC initiated action against Mile High Radio (KIMN) 
in 1958 for an announcer's comments, which included such 
inflammatory phrases as "flushing pajamas down the toilet," 
"inflating 'cheaters' with helium," and "the guy who goosed the 
ghost and got a handful of sheet.,,101 The Broadcast Bureau (the 
MAE: I don't need you! I got men for every mood-men for every day in the 
week-Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday-I change my men like I 
change my clothes! 
CHARLIE: Mae! Mae! You're not walking out on me, are you? 
MAE: I got a reputation at stake! No man walks out on me-they might carry them 
out, but they never walk out! 
Mae West ended up taking most of the heat, earning a ban from NBC that lasted for nearly 
twenty years; her name was not even mentioned for over a decade. Standard Brands, the radio 
program's sponsor, issued a formal apology on the following week's program. In a rather sexist 
result, Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy escaped unscathed and went on to star in the most 
popular act on radio. 
96. 83 CONGo REc. H561 (daily ed. Jan. 26,1938) (statements of Rep. Connery). 
97. EMILYW. LEIDER, BECOMING MAE WEST 342 (1997). 
98. MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: "INDECENCY," 
CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 92 (2001). 
99. Note, State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73 HARv. 1. REv. 386, 390 (1959). 
100. See HEINS, supra note 98, at 98; see also DAVID HALBESTROM, THE FIFTIES (1993). 
101. HEINS, supra note 98, at 92; see also Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795, 798 
(1960). 
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office in the FCC that handled indecency complaints at that time) 
and FCC chairman sought to revoke KIMN's license, but the 
majority of the Commission simply issued a cease and desist order. 102 
Importantly, the Commission did not rely on section 1464's explicit 
obscenity and indecency prohibition in its KIMN indecency inquiry, 
but rather on a more general public-interest standard.103 
Encouraging conservative approaches in broadcast, the National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the umbrella trade group of 
television and radio stations, promulgated private industry censorship 
codes for radio and television. These codes were in effect during the 
1950s and 1960s. The private code prohibited broadcast of 
"offensive language, vulgarity, illicit sexual relations, sex crimes, and 
abnormalities during any time period when children comprised a 
substantial segment of the viewing audience.,,104 
B. Changing Times 
Just as the 1960s marked a turning point in the political and 
legal underpinnings of American society, the period marked a shift in 
broadcast enforcement as well. The FCC's action against "Uncle 
Charlie," host of the Charlie Walker Show, was a harbinger of things 
to come. 105 "Uncle Charlie" used suggestive puns during his on-air 
program, changing names of local places from "Andrews" to "Ann's 
Drawers" and "Bloomville" to "Bloomersville" and using phrases 
such as "let it all hang out.,,106 In response, the FCC issued its first 
modern denial of a license renewal on the basis of immoral 
broadcasting. l07 The FCC ruled that WDKD subjected housewives, 
teenagers, and young children to offensive remarks. lOS As with the 
Mile High enforcement several years earlier, the Commission did not 
rely on section 1464's explicit obscenity and indecency prohibition 
but applied a more general public-interest standard.109 
102. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
166-67 (1987). 
103. Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. at 797. 
104. See BRUCEA. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING 11-15 (1967). 
105. See HEINS, supra note 98, at 92-93. 
106. Id. at 92 
107. Id. 
108. Palmetto Broad. Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), affd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 
F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
109. Id. at 258. 
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When Richard Nixon's appointees assumed dominant positions 
at the FCC in the late 1960s and early 1970s, indecency 
enforcement accelerated. A January 1970 interview with Jerry Garcia 
provided the FCC an opportunity to apply the obscenity and 
indecency prohibitions of section 1464 directly. In an interview with 
Eastern Education Radio in Philadelphia, Garcia used the words 
"s--" and "f--", mostly as adjectives, introductory phrases, or 
"substitutes for 'et cetera. ",llO The Commission fined Eastern 
Education one hundred dollars. ill 
Between June 1972 and June 1973, there was a flood of 
complaints, many in response to a new broadcast format sweeping 
the country called "topless radio.,,112 Initially appearing in California, 
it typically featured an announcer and a female call-in guest 
discussing sexual matters. ll3 The FCC took action against WGLD-
FM, owned by Sonderling Broadcasting in Oak Park, Illinois, for a 
discussion· of oral sex that included a recommendation for 
performing it "when you're driving" to take "the monotony out of 
things.,,114 At the time, the Commission had no explicit regulatory 
standard for either obscenity or indecency. It only had the statutory 
mandate in § 1464 prohibiting broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or 
profane" material. ll5 
The Commission declared the program obscene and fined the 
station $2,000. 116 To reach this conclusion, it relied on the Supreme 
Court's three-prong test for obscenity first expressed in Roth v. 
United StateP7 and later refined in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. ll8 
Following the Court's standard, the Commission found the 
broadcast obscene because (1) the dominant theme of the material 
appealed to the prurient interest, (2) the material was patently 
offensive by contemporary community standards; and (3) the 
material was without redeeming social value. ll9 The D.C. Circuit 
llO. POWE,supranote 102, at 175. 
Ill. Id.at176 
ll2. Id. at 182-83. 
ll3. Id. at 182. 
ll4. Id. 
ll5. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). 
ll6. Sanderling Broad. Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 919, 920 (1973). 
ll7. Id. (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. 476,489 (1957)). 
ll8. Id. (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966)). 
ll9. Id. 
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affirmed the decision in Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting 
v. FCC. 120 
While Illinois Citizens was on appeal, New York City's WEAl 
aired a monologue that was destined to shape broadcast content 
regulation to this day. On Tuesday, October 30, 1973, WEAl played 
a twelve-minute sequence from George Carlin's album "Occupation: 
Foole," about four-letter words and the seven words "you couldn't 
say on the public ... airwaves."121 The program was originally 
produced by Pacifica Radio. 122 
The Commission received a complaint from a man, who, in the 
words of the Supreme Court: 
stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young 
son [and] wrote a letter complaining to the Commission. He stated 
that, although he could perhaps understand the "record's being 
sold for private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of 
[the] same over the air that, supposedly, you control. ,,123 
In fact, the complainant was John R. Douglas, a member of the 
national planning board of Morality in Media, a conservative 
organization founded by a Jesuit priest in 1962.124 As Lucas Powe 
argues, Douglas was not the typical Pacifica listener, and his 
complaint appears to have been a calculated effort to achieve certain 
legal and political aims. 125 Powe points to Douglas's six-week delay 
in submitting his complaint and his description of his fifteen-year-old 
son as his "young son" as evidence that Douglas probably did not 
even hear the broadcast. 126 
Regardless of the facts, Douglas's efforts had their policy effects: 
ever since the Douglas complaint, the use of the complaint process 
by special interest groups to achieve political aims has been a 
constant in broadcast content regulation. Reacting to the Pacifica 
complaint, FCC Chairman Richard "Dick" Wiley prophesied 
threateningly about further regulation unless broadcasters showed 
120. 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
121. POWE, supra note 102, at 185-86; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 
(1978). 
122. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30. 
123. Id. at 730. 
124. POWE, supra note 102, at 186; see also Morality in Media, Inc., 
http://www.moralityinmedia.org (last visited Nov. 3,2005). 
125. POWE, supra note 102, at 186. 
126. Id. 
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"taste discretion and decency. ,,127 Congress made noises urging 
further FCC action against indecency. These looming threats of 
regulation resulted in a 1975 TV agreement among the FCC and 
broadcasters for a family viewing hour. 128 
Legally, the complaint had an even greater effect. The FCC's 
decision was reversed by the D.C. Circuit, and the FCC then 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court issued the famous FCC 
v. Pacifica Foundation decision that continues to form the basis of 
broadcast regulation to the present day.129 The decision articulated 
the difference between indecency and obscenity, giving the FCC the 
power to regulate indecency yo 
C. Post-Pacifica and the Brief Reign of the Seven Dirty Words 
After Pacifica, the FCC did not rush to enunciate a standard of 
indecency based upon the broad definitions set forth in the Supreme 
Court opinion. Rather, it simply enforced the rule-never explicitly 
stated in Pacifica but certainly proceeding from a conservative 
reading of it-that seven dirty words (and a few others) were 
prohibited from being spoken on the air before 10:00 p.m. l3l The 
FCC narrowly construed Pacifica to mean that indecency did not 
extend beyond the seven dirty words (and a few others). 
This hands-off regulation continued during the chairmanship of 
Reagan appointee Mark Fowler. 132 He was a deregulation crusader 
and was personally loath to involve the Commission in any sort of 
broadcast-content regulation. At one time he stated, "[I]fyou don't 
like it, just don't let your kids watch it. ,,133 Although in the years 
127. Id. at 187. 
128. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 
556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
129. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726; Kevin J. Martin, Family-Friendly Programming: 
Providing More Toolsfor Parents, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 553, 558 (2003). 
130. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740. 
131. HEINS, SIIpra note 98, at 104; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 
930-31 (1987). 
132. Mark Conrad, Constitutionality of FCC's New Indecency Rules, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 17, 
1990, at 5 ("F[rom] 1975 to 1987, peace reigned on the airwaves as a policy of 'benign 
neglect' occurred."); Alex S. Jones, F.GG Studies 'Indecency' on Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 
1986, at Al ("The commission has not sent such [inquiries about indecency] since 1978 .... 
Under Presidents Carter and Reagan, the commission has strongly advocated a hands-off 
attitude regarding broadcast programming of all kinds."). 
133. HEINS, supra note 98, at 109 (quoting ROBERT LIEBERT & JOYCE SPRAFKIN, THE 
EARLY WINDOW: EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 50 (3d ed. 1988)}. 
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preceding 1986, the FCC annually received approximately 20,000 
complaints alleging obscenity or indecency, it failed to act on any of 
them. 134 
However, Fowler's hands-off strategy did not sit well with 
numerous conservative groups, including Morality in Media-the 
catalyst in the Pacifica case. Shortly after Fowler's renomination in 
June 1986, Morality in Media initiated a picketing campaign at the 
FCC. Along with groups like the National Decency Forum, it also 
wrote hundreds of letters to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation opposing Mr. Fowler's renomination. 135 
The Reverend Donald Wildmon, Executive Director of the National 
Federation of Decency, called upon his supporters "to oppose Mr. 
Fowler's renomination because he had done 'nothing, zero, zilch' 
about indecency during his tenure. ,,136 
These groups applied direct pressure to the FCC as well. In early 
July 1986, Chairman Fowler met with Brad Curl of the National 
Decency Forum, who met thereafter with the FCC's General 
Counsel, Jack SmithY7 In a letter dated July 9, 1986, Mr. Curl 
advised the Chairman that, on the basis of their discussion, his 
organization would discontinue the planned picketing for the 
following week.138 The letter stated that the FCC General Counsel 
had agreed to "cooperate on some decency actions and some further 
investigations of our point of view. ,,139 Curl declared, "I agree that 
the citizens have not been bringing you enough complaints, and I 
will take action to publicize the need for more documented citizen 
complaints." 140 In the letter, Curl acknowledged Mr. Smith's 
willingness "to cooperate on a few 'send a message' cases.,,141 On 
July 21, 1986, Curl, this time joined by Paul McGeady of Morality 
in Media, had another meeting with Chairman Fowler. 142 A couple 
134. John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious History of the New 
FCC Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 329, 344-45 (1989). 
135. Id. at 344. 
136. Id.; see also HEINS, supra note 98, at 112; Bob Davis, FCC Chief Shifts Obscenity 
View as He Seeks Job Reappointment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 44. 
137. Davis, supra note 136, at 44. 
138. HEINS, supra note 98, at 112 (citing Letter from Brad Curl, National Director, 
Morality in Media, to Mark Fowler, Chairman, FCC (July 9,1986)). 
139. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 345. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 345. 
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of days later, Morality in Media sent the FCC a memorandum 
outlining a legal campaign to censure "indecent" programming. 143 
Application of this pressure soon brought positive results for groups 
such as Morality in the Media and the National Federation of 
Decency. 
D. The End of the Reign of the Seven Dirty Words and 
the Broadening of the Fee)s Indecency Approach 
Under pressure from socially conservative groups, the FCC 
responded with three indecency actions in the course of four 
months. First, Morality in Media gave the FCC General Counsel 
tapes ofa Howard Stern show aired on WYSP-FM in Philadelphia. l44 
In response, the FCC sent an indecency inquiry to Infinity 
Broadcasting Corporation, licensee of WYSP_FM.14S The FCC's 
inquiry focused on Howard Stern's morning show and its sexual 
banter. 146 
Second, Nathan Post complained to the FCC about the song 
Makin) Bacon played over the University of California station, 
KCSB-FM Santa Barbara.147 He then wrote to the Parents Music 
Resource Center/48 an action that led to direct White House 
involvement. 149 He said in a newspaper interview, "It shocked me 
when, kaboom! they took my letter to the White House and sent 
Patrick Buchanan to the FCC where he read them the riot act."lSO 
Responding to Post's and other listeners' complaints, the FCC sent 
an inquiry to KCSB-FM, Santa Barbara on September 22, 1986.151 
143. Id. (citing Letter from Paul J. McGeady, General Counsel, Morality in Media, to 
John B. Smith, General Counsel, FCC (July 23,1986)). 
144. See Davis, supra note 136, at 44. 
145. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); Infinity Broad. Corp. of 
Pa.,2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987). 
146. Infinity Broad. Corp. ofPa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705. 
147. Dennis McDougal, He's a Crt/sader Against Indecency, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1987, 
§ 6, at 1. 
148. The Parents Music Resource Center was made prominent by Tipper Gore's 
campaign to label albums on the basis of the explicimess of their lyrics. [d. 
149. McDougal, supra note 147, at 1. 
150. [d. 
151. See Infinity Broad. Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705; Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 
F.C.C.R. 2703. 
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Third, on September 1, 1986, Larry Poland lodged a complaint 
against Pacifica station KPFK 152 for a post-10:00 p.m. broadcast of 
excerpts from a sexually graphic play, Jerker. 153 A short while later, 
the FCC's General Counsel called to tell Mr. Poland that the FCC 
had decided to "take this one all the way to the Supreme Court" and 
that Poland was "going to be famous. ,,154 That fall, the FCC advised 
KPFK-FM radio, Los Angeles, that it had received complaints about 
"obscene or indecent programming broadcast during the evening 
hours on Station KPFK-FM.,,155 The FCC directed the Chairman of 
Pacifica to comment on the attached complaints within thirty days.156 
These actions were not simply cosmetic political maneuverings. 
Particularly after Chairman Fowler's departure from office in the 
spring of 1987, they represented a real shift in indecency policy away 
from the minimalist "seven dirty words" approach to a more general 
standard of indecency. 157 On April 29, 1987, the FCC promulgated 
orders against these three licensees, 158 as well as a Public Notice 
announcing that the indecency policies articulated in the orders were 
declaratory rulings with binding precedential effect on all licensees. 159 
Incoming FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick stated explicitly that these 
rulings represented a sea change in regulation. He said, "[W]hat we 
152. See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 348 (citing Letter from LaITy w. Poland, 
President, Mastermedia International, Inc., to Mark Fowler, Chairman, FCC (Sept. 1, 1986». 
153. Dennis McDougal, How 7erker' Helped Ignite Obscenity Debate, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
18,1987, at 1. 
154. Mr. Poland also repeated the story in a television interview broadcast nationwide. 
See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 346 (citing McNeil Lehrer News Hour: Expletive 
Deleted (PBS television broadcast Nov. 24, 1987». 
155. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 346. 
156. [d. 
157. The irony of Fowler's departure coinciding with a reemergence of aggressive 
broadcast regulation was not lost by contemporary commentators: 
When the Federal Communications Commission declared last week that it was 
going to crack down on sexually explicit language in broadcasting, it was slapping 
itself on the wrist. Or shooting itself in the foot .... In an ironic way, the dirty· 
words decision last week is like the first coat of farewell tar-and-feathers for Fowler, 
who officially left office on Friday. 
[d. at 335 n.34 (citing Tom Shales, Fowler's Way: Foul is Fair, WASH. POST, April 20, 1987, at 
Bl). 
158. New Indecency Enforcement Standards To Be Applied to All Broad. and Amateur 
Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2727 (1987) [hereinafter New Enforcement Standards]. 
159. [d. at 2727. 
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are doing today is to correct an altogether too narrow interpretation 
of indecency. ,,160 
The Public Notice, as well as the three indecency orders, stated 
that the FCC would abandon the limited definition of indecency as 
Carlin's seven dirty words and thereafter apply the generic definition 
of indecency set forth in Pacifica. The FCC defined indecency as 
"language or material that depicts or describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs.,,161 The 
FCC announced a policy of channeling indecent broadcasting to 
times when "there is not a reasonable risk that children may be in the 
audience. ,,162 
On June 1, 1987, the National Association of Broadcasters filed 
a Petition for Clarification, and fourteen broadcasters and media 
representatives jointly filed a Petition for Reconsideration of the 
April 29, 1987 Public Notice.163 These groups did not question the 
constitutional basis for the Public Notice. Instead, they sought 
numerous revisions that would: 
( 1) provide more precise guidance as to the elements 
pertinent to whether material is "patently offensive" and 
violates "contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium"; (2) consider the literary, artistic, 
political and scientific value of programming in judging 
whether it is patently offensive and, thus, indecent; (3) 
exempt news and informational programming from a finding 
of indecency; (4) defer to reasonable good faith judgments 
made by licensees applying the requirements set forth by the 
Commission; (5) apply rulings prospectively, not sanctioning 
licensees until they have notice that particular material has 
been judged to be indecent; and (6) adopt a fixed time of 
160. Neil Borowski, FCC Targets (Indecent) Broadcasts, PHlLA. INQUIRER, Apr. 17, 
1987, at AI. 
161. New Enforcement Standards, supra note 158, at 2726 (citing Pacifica Found., 56 
F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev)d sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 
rev)d sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)). 
161. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
162. New Enforcement Standards, supra note 158, at 2726. 
163. Infinity Broad. Corp. ofPa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930, 935 n.l (1987). 
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day after which non-obscene, adult oriented programming 
may be aired, or articulate a similar "bright line" test. 164 
The Commission's Reconsideration Order did a few of these 
things. It established a definite time, 12:00 a.m., after which the 
indecency regulations would not apply.165 It also identified numerous 
factors that would enter into an indecency judgment, such as the 
vulgar or shocking nature of the words or depictions, the manner in 
which the language or depictions were presented, the isolated or 
fleeting nature of the offensive material, the medium's ability to 
separate adults from children, the likely presence of children in the 
audience, and the material's artistic or literary merit. 166 It also stated 
that "contemporary community standards" looked to the national 
community, not the local broadcaster. 167 
In Action for Children)s Television v. FCC ("ACT r), a group of 
petitioners, including Infinity Broadcasting and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), challenged the Reconsideration Order as 
overly broad and unconstitutionally vague. 168 The D.C. Court of 
Appeals rejected this challenge but found that the safe harbor times, 
which prohibited broadcast of indecent materials between the hours 
of 6:00 a.m. and 12:00 a.m., were not sufficiently supported; thus, 
the court remanded them for further reconsideration. 169 
Congress did not like this result. In 1988, Senator Jesse Helms 
introduced an appropriations rider requiring the FCC to set forth 
regulations enforcing its indecency rules on a twenty-four-hour 
basis. l7O The D.C. Court of Appeals, in Action for Children)s 
Television v. FCC ("ACT IF'), ruled that the amendment completely 
prohibiting indecent speech was not sufficiently tailored to satisfy 
164. Infinity Broad. Corp. ofPa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930,931 (1987), affd in part, vacated in 
part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
165. Id. at 934 ("[W]hereas previously we indicated that 10:00 p.m. was a reasonable 
delineation point, we now indicate that 12:00 midnight is our current thinking as to when it is 
reasonable to expect that it is late enough to ensure that the risk of children in the audience is 
minimized .... "). 
166. Id. at 932. 
167. Id. at 933. 
168. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988), SlIperceded in part, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
169. Id. at 1342, 1344. 
170. Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608,102 Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988). 
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First Amendment standards.!7! It rejected the FCC rule written to 
enforce the rider and remanded the safe harbor issue to the FCC. 172 
Congress again stepped in and passed the Public 
Telecommunications Act of 1992.173 The Act required the FCC to 
reestablish a safe harbor for indecent speech from 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 
a.m., with an exception for public broadcasters who could broadcast 
indecent materials after 10:00 p.m. 174 In 1995, the D.C. Circuit in 
Action for ChildrenJs Television v. FCC ("ACT IIr), found that, 
standing alone, the 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. prohibition was 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling public interest. 175 However, 
since the preferential treatment for public television stations was not 
justified by a compelling state interest, the court set aside the more 
restrictive 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. prohibition.!76 This safe harbor 
provision is still in place in the FCC's regulations. 177 
E. The FCC in the 1990s and the Powell Chairmanship 
After ACT III finally clarified the extent of the FCC jurisdiction 
over broadcast indecency, the FCC assumed a middle course in 
regulation. Perhaps reflecting the more conservative, "Sister 
Souljah"!78 tendency of the Clinton administration, the FCC 
leadership pursued indecency complaints with notable, but limited, 
vigor, directing the lion's share of the total amount of fines to 
Howard Stern.!79 During the 1990s, the FCC issued relatively few 
indecency fines. From 1987 until 1997, the FCC issued thirty-six 
171. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), superseded in part, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
172. Id. 
173. Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16, 106 Stat. 949 (1992). 
174. Id. 
175. 58 F.3d 654, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en bane). 
176. Id. at 669. 
177. See 47 c.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004). 
178. See Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton Raps Sister Souljah)s Remarks, WASH. TIMES, June 
14, 1992, at A4. Clinton lambasted rapper Sister Souljah for encouraging violence against 
whites. His remarks increased his appeal to moderate voters, but alienated some political allies. 
The term has since entered the political lexicon. 
179. Kristen A. Finch, Comment, Lights, Camera) and Actino for Children)s Television v. 
FCC: The Story of Broadcast Indecency, Starring Howard Stern, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1275, 1326 
(1995) ("In response to public demand for tougher standards of indecency, the Clinton 
administration has taken a regulatory point of view."); The FCC Crackdown: Stern ShoJV, Bono 
Cited for Indecency, NEWSDAY, Mar. 19,2004, at A06 ("The Center for Responsive Politics, a 
watchdog group, said fines against Stern accounted for almost half of the $4 million in 
penalties proposed by the FCC since 1990.") 
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fines l80 and from 1997 until the inauguration of George W. Bush in 
2001, the FCC issued sixteen fines. 181 Since 1990, only three fines 
have been levied against television broadcasters, representing about 
four percent of the total number of indecency fines. 182 During the 
Clinton administration, FCC Chairmen Reed Hundt and William 
Kennard oversaw some indecency fines, most notably those against 
Howard Stern, who settled numerous indecency actions with the 
FCC for $1.7 million in 1995.183 The total amounts of indecency 
fines remained relatively constant, however, with total yearly NALsl84 
ranging between $25,500 and $49,000 during the second Clinton 
administration. 18s 
With the election of George W. Bush and his subsequent 
appointment of Michael Powell as FCC Commissioner, fines levied 
for broadcast indecency rose in dramatic fashion. From the 
beginning of his term, Powell increased the fine amount in his first 
year from $48,000 to $91,000.186 In 2004, the last full year of his 
service, the FCC fined broadcasters an astounding $7,928,080-
more than in the ten prior years combined. 187 
This might seem surprising based on Powell's public statements 
prior to becoming chairman. Michael Powell had served as one of 
the five FCC Commissioners for four years before President George 
W. Bush appointed him chairman. 188 As Commissioner, he expressed 
a disinclination to vigorously enforce the indecency prohibitions. In 
2001, he publicly stated that "[i]t is better to tolerate the abuses on 
the margins than to invite the government to interfere with the 
180. Milagros Rivera-Sanchez & Michelle Ballard, A Decade of Indecency EnforcemC1lt: A 
Study of How the Federal Communications Commission Assesses Indecency Fines (1987-1997), 75 
JOURNALISM & MAss COMM. Q. 143, 146 (1998). According to the FCC data, there were 
fewer than sixteen NALs between 1998 and 2000. Between 2001 and 2003, there were 
seventeen NALs. In 2004, however, there were twelve. Federal Communications Commission, 
Indecency Complaints and NALs: 1993-2005, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ 
CompIStatChart.pdf(last visited Dec. 31,2005) [hereinafter Indecency Complaints]. 
181. See Indecency Complaints, supra note 180. 
182. Dunbar, supra note 2. 
183. Id. 
184. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
185. See Federal Communications Commission, Notices of Apparent Liability, 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/NAL.html (last visited Dec. 20,2005). 
186. Indecency Complaints, supra note 180. 
187. Id.; Dunbar, supra note 2. 
188. See Federal Communications Commission, Previous FCC Commissioners, 
www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previouscommish.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). 
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cherished First Amendment."189 In 1999, he accepted the Media 
Institute's Freedom of Speech Award with a stirring defense of the 
First Amendment: "We should think twice before allowing the 
government the discretion to filter information to us as they see 
fit.,,190 As an FCC Commissioner, he said, "[G]overnment has been 
engaged for too long in willful denial in order to subvert the 
Constitution so that it can impose its speech preferences on the 
public-exactly the sort of infringement of individual freedom the 
Constitution was masterfully designed to prevent.,,191 Even after he 
became Chairman, he said, "I don't know that I want the 
government as my nanny. ,,192 
But later, Chairman Powell changed his tune. 193 He overcame his 
hesitance and compunction about exercising power and eventually 
presided over the largest indecency crackdown in FCC history, 
stating, "I do not have the luxury of ignoring my duty to enforce the 
statute because owners might react with excessive conservatism.,,194 
The infamous 2004 Super Bowl halftime wardrobe 
malfunction-when Justin Timberlake ripped open Janet Jackson's 
bustier to reveal her right breast-brought indecency to the center of 
the national political discussion. The FCC reacted with promises of a 
thorough investigation-which resulted in a hefty fine-and more 
promises of vigilance.!95 Reacting to the public outcry, Congress 
considered, and is still considering, numerous bills to significantly 
stiffen indecency penalties.196 Indeed, there is some talk, particularly 
from Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and FCC Commissioner Kevin 
Martin, to apply indecency rules to cable and satellite television as 
welU97 
189. Powell's Legacy, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 12,2004, at HI. 
190. Jarvis, supra note 5, at 11. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. See Paul Sweeting, Keeping it Clean, VIDEO Bus., Feb. 11, 2005, 
http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA612072.html ("Although Powell got with the 
program, he was always something of a reluctant cultural warrior, having previously expressed 
uneasiness over the FCC's role as censor."). 
194. Jarvis, supra note 5,at 11. 
195. Ahrens & Moraes, supra note 179. 
196. Communications Daily, Brownback Shipping Indecency Legislation to Senators, 
(Jan. 26, 2005) 2005 WL 2777507. 
197. David Kaplan, Comcast's Jack of All Trades, Broadcasting and Cable (Apr. 4, 2005) 
2005 WLNR5356069. 
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Powell, however, had been pursuing an aggressive stance towards 
indecency even before the wardrobe malfunction. 198 One commenter 
stated that the incident merely "provided a well-timed boost to the 
FCC's ongoing attempts to enforce indecency regulations more 
stringently.,,199 A week before the 2004 Super Bowl, the FCC issued 
a NAL against Clear Channel Communications for $755,000 
because of statements made by Bubba the Love Sponge, a colorful 
radio personality.20o Additionally, on October 2, 2003, the FCC 
proposed a $357,000 fine against Infinity Broadcasting Operations, 
Inc. for an Opie and Anthony radio show broadcast that included a 
contest encouraging couples to engage in sex in public places, like 
the St. Patrick's Cathedra1.201 The Janet Jackson incident, however, 
led to a tremendous intensification of enforcement. 
Once again, the role of social conservative groups proved central. 
The number of complaints skyrocketed from 13,992 in 2002, to 
166,683 in 2003, to an astounding 1,405,419 through October 
2004, largely due to the Janet Jackson incident.202 Some analysts 
claim that over ninety-nine percent of 2004 complaints-barring 
those involving Jackson-were sent by the Parents Television 
Council, a conservative political group with connections to the 
Republican Party.203 
Beyond the sheer number and size of Powell's indecency 
enforcements, his administration saw an unprecedented expansion of 
the FCC's authority under § 1464. For instance, during the Golden 
Globe award ceremony, which was televised live on January 19, 
2003, the singer Bono used the phrase "f--ing brilliant" when 
accepting an award for his song The Hands That B'uilt America.204 
198. See Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill? Congress and the FCC Crack Down on 
Indecency, 22 COMM. LAw., Spring 2004, at 1, 25. 
199. Id. 
200. Clear Channel Broad. Licenses, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 1768 (2004). 
201. Infinity Broad. Operations, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. 19,954 (2003). 
202. Federal Communications Commission, Notices of Apparent Liability, 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/NAL.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005); see Indecency 
Complaints, supra note 180. 
203. Shields, supra note 8, at 4; see also http Indecency Complaints, supra note 180. This 
figure is disputed; some claim the figure is only twenty percent. See FCC Complaints Filed by 
PTC Members, CNSNews.com Information Services, Jan. 10 2005, 
http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/archive/200501/CUL20050110g.html. 
204. See Susan Crabtree, Congloms to pol pack: Not a f, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 20, 2004, 
available at 2004 WLNR 12542619. 
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Based on FCC regulations that define indecency as depicting sexual 
or excretory organs and dwelling on sexual matters/os the FCC's 
Enforcement Bureau initially rejected the resulting indecency 
complaints on the ground that one fleeting word could not be 
indecent.206 Further, it is hardly clear from the context that Bono 
used the work "f--ing" to refer to anything sexual. Rather, as he 
used the word, it was probably synonymous with "very" or 
"extremely." The FCC Commissioners, however, rejected the 
Enforcement Bureau's ruling.207 The Commission ruled that, 
contrary to its own precedent, one fleeting use of the word is 
indecent. It argued that "given the core meaning of the 'F-Word,' 
any use of that word or a variation, in any context, inherently has a 
sexual connotation.,,208 Thus, the Commission simply disregarded 
the factor requiring that indecent programming dwell on sexual or 
excretory functions. 
Even more remarkable, the Commission determined that the 
broadcast was profane, which specifically means blasphemous speech 
in legal contexts, at least in prior legal pronouncements.209 The FCC 
had rarely, if ever, found licensees liable for profane language. To 
find another successful sanction based on profane speech, one has to 
go to the FCC's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, and its 
1931 action in Duncan v. United States. 210 
The FCC attempted to distinguish this strong precedent in two 
ways. First, it muddied the difference between profane and profanity, 
205. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
206. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 18 F.C.C.R.. 19,859 (2003). 
207. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004). 
208. Id. at 4978; see also Clay Calvert, Bono, the Culture Wars, and a Profane Decision: 
The FCC's Reversal of Course on Indecency Determinations and Its New Path on Profanity, 28 
SEATfLE U. L. REv. 61,64-75 (2004). 
209. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1226 (7th ed. 1999) (defining profane as "(Of 
speech or conduct) irreverent to something held sacred"). The only FCC precedent on the 
matter reflects this understanding. See Raycom Am., Inc, 18 F.C.C.R. 4186 (2003) (calling 
God a "sonofabitch" is not profane under § 1464) (citing Gagliardo v. United States, 366 
F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that "God damn it" is not profane under § 1464); 
Warren B. Appleton, 28 F.C.C.2d 36 (1971) (deciding that "damn" is not profane under § 
1464)). 
210. 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931) (upholding conviction under § 1464 for using 
profane language where "the defendant ... referred to an individual as 'damned,' ... used the 
expression 'By God' irreverently, and ... announced his intention to call down the curse of 
God upon certain individuals"). 
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glibly stating that "the use of the phrase at issue here in the context 
and at the time of day here constitutes 'profane' language under 18 
U.S.C. § 1464."211 The word "profanity" is commonly defined as 
"vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language";212 however, the word does 
not appear in the statute. As weak support for its position, the FCC 
relied on a thirty-year-old opinion, discussing the constitutionality of 
§ 1464's use of the terms "indecency and profane.,,213 Second, the 
FCC relied on an old precedent defining profanity as a nuisance. In 
dicta in Tallman v. United States, the court stated without citation 
that profane is "construable as denoting certain of those personally 
reviling epithets naturally tending to provoke violent resentment or 
denoting language which under contemporary community standards 
is so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it 
as to amount to a nuisance."214 Relying on this precedent, the 
Commission concluded that Bono's phrase was profane "under the 
Seventh Circuit nuisance rationale. Use of the 'F-Word' in the 
context at issue here is also clearly the kind of vulgar and coarse 
language that is commonly understood to fall within the definition 
of 'profanity. ",215 This analysis by the agency constitutes aggressive 
statutory interpretation to say the least. 
Furthermore, this aggressive interpretation may not be lawful. 
The NAL indecency procedure is probably classified as an informal 
adjudication and, therefore, the strong rules of precedent applying to 
formal adjudication do not apply. An agency is free to ignore its own 
precedent, provided it explains its change of policy.216 As Richard 
Pierce states, "The dominant law clearly is that an agency must either 
follow its own precedents or explain why it departs from them. ,,217 
211. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4981. 
212. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990)). 
213. Id. 
214. 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972). This definition only had persuasive weight 
because, as the court noted, the indictment at issue was for obscenity. Id. 
215. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4981.' 
216. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 V.S. 800, 807-
08 (1973) (asserting adjudicatory decisions "may serve as precedents" and that the agency's 
"duty to explain its departure from prior norms" flows from that presumption). 
217. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 11.5 at 817 (2002); 
see also Atchison, 412 V.S. at 807-08; Kelley ex rei. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res. v. FERC, 96 
F.3d 1482, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("It is, of course, axiomatic that an agency adjudication 
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To the extent that informal adjudication does include 
justifications for actions, the agency must provide justifications for 
departures.218 Arguably, the FCC's decision constitutes a change in 
the FCC's understanding of the words "indecent" and "profane" as 
established in its informal adjudication and its informal 
rulemaking.219 Such a change most likely requires further notice and 
comment.220 
V. A DIFFERENT LOOK AT MEDIA MARKETS 
As argued in Part III, the FCC's regulatory focus stems from 
almost a century-old set of assumptions concerning the licensee and 
the viewer. What if these assumptions completely miss the mark? 
What if they misrepresent or distort the true economic nature of the 
broadcast market? This Part sets forth an economic argument that 
the current set of regulatory assumptions does miss the mark, failing 
to account for a key relationship in broadcast markets between the 
viewer and the advertiser. This Part suggests a regulatory regime 
based upon a more complete understanding of media markets. 
A. Broadcasting: A Two-Sided Market 
Many markets, such as advertiser-supported media (like radio 
and broadcast television) or credit-card markets, display what 
economists term "two-sidedness." Firms in two-sided markets face 
two different sets of consumers, and each set of consumers affects the 
desirability of the product for the other set of consumers. For 
example, consider retailers. They function within a two-sided market. 
On one side, they sell goods to consumers. On the other, they 
furnish business to credit card companies by providing a place where 
consumers use credit cards.221 
must either be consistent with prior adjudications or offer a reasoned basis for its departure 
from precedent."). 
218. 2 PIERCE, supra note 217, at 820. 
219. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
220. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
("To allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive 
regulation without notice and comment obviously would undermine those APA requirements 
[of informal rulemaking under section 555 of the APAJ."). 
221. The number of stores willing to accept a certain bank's credit card affects the 
desirability of that bank's credit card for shoppers. For example, many shoppers prefer VISA to 
the Discover card because of its higher acceptance rate in retail stores. The more stores that 
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Radio and broadcast firms must optimize over two markets as 
well. The number of viewers that watch a television program affects 
advertisers' demand for commercial time on that program. Clearly, 
during its heyday, "Friends" commanded a higher per-minute price 
for advertising than the mercifully short-lived "Joey" spin-off. If the 
broadcaster sells too much commercial time, however, fewer viewers 
will watch even if the show is "Friends." In other words, a 
broadcaster of a popular program must strike a balance between 
advertisers, who are anxious to purchase valuable commercial time, 
and viewers, who may be driven away if there are too many 
commercials. 
To strike this balance and optimize both sides of the market, the 
broadcaster generally charges advertisers an explicit price for 
commercial time-i.e., a price for a minute of commercial on a given 
show. A television broadcaster also charges viewers an implicit price 
for watching-that is, the amount of commercial time that viewers 
endure. This amount can be priced relative to each viewer's 
opportunity costs. In other words, the value of the opportunities the 
viewer foregoes in order to watch a given commercial is the price he 
or she pays for a television show. 222 
Simply put, the economics of broadcast television require that 
advertisers pay for programming and bundle commercials with the 
programming. Viewers pay advertisers for the programming through 
their willingness to watch the commercials. In this sense, the 
broadcaster is simply a conduit for the exchange between advertisers 
and viewers.223 
Understanding this relationship between broadcasters, viewers, 
and advertisers illustrates that indecency regulation must not focus 
accept a bank's credit card, the more shoppers want to use that bank's credit card. On the 
other side of the market, the credit card company will seek the greatest number of retailers to 
honor its card, and the larger the retailer, the better. A retailer that wishes to maximize its 
profits will aim to pay a credit-card fee (the remission a retailer pays to the credit card 
company) that maximizes profits by balancing both sides of its market. In other words, firms 
that face two-sided markets set two different prices, one for each set of consumers. A decrease 
in the price to one set of consumers might increase the price to the other set. 
222. See Stephen Coate & Simon Anderson, Market Provision of Public Goods: The Case of 
Broadcasting (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7513, 2000), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7513.pdf. 
223. See generally Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as 
a Good or Bad, 108 Q.J. ECON. 941 (1993) (demonstrating that this understanding of 
advertising fits nicely within neoclassical economics). 
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solely on the relationship between viewers and programmers, but 
should also include the relationship between viewers and advertisers. 
After all, broadcasters act as the conduit of exchange between 
advertisers and viewers. Involving advertisers in indecency regulation 
may be just as important as, if not more important than, involving 
broadcasters. In addition, advertisers want viewers who are receptive 
to their advertisements. To the extent that advertisers learn which 
content makes viewers less receptive to their advertisements, 
advertisers obtain value from being involved with indecency 
regulation. 
B. Applying a Two-Sided Market Paradigm to Indecency Regulation 
As established in Part IV, FCC broadcast regulations have 
concentrated on one side of the market: the viewer-broadcaster 
relationship. What would the regulations look like if they 
concentrated on the other side of the market as well? 
Compare broadcast to other two-sided markets like retail and 
credit cards. Clearly, there is a functioning competitive market for 
both retail and credit cards, and consumers benefit from competition 
in both markets. Consumers, to some degree, will make decisions 
about what retail firms to patronize based on which credit cards they 
accept or whether they accept credit cards at all. For instance, one 
might not go to a restaurant that accepts only cash, or might go to a 
restaurant because it honors a certain credit card-say one for which 
the consumer has a particularly good frequent flyer program. 
Does the same thing occur in the broadcast markets? Do 
individuals, in fact, make viewing decisions based on which firms 
advertise on such programming? Do viewers get anything from 
advertisers for the value of their "eyeballs" as consumers do for using 
particular credit cards? 
In other words, if this advertiser information were supplied 
inexpensively, would consumers change their viewing (and 
purchasing) behavior to "punish" advertisers who support indecent 
programming in a way analogous to consumers refusing to patronize 
certain restaurants that fail to accept certain credit cards? True, the 
mere existence of indecent programming suggests that some 
segment of the population likes it. Howard Stern does have a loyal 
listening audience. However, if there are enough people who are so 
offended by Stern that they will boycott his advertisers, then the 
viewer-advertiser side of the market is at work. 
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There are some notable examples of viewer backlash against 
advertisers even without a regulatory provision of information. For 
instance, Terri Rakolta led a public campaign against the Fox 
network television sitcom Married . .. with Children. 224 She viewed 
an episode entitled "Her Cups Runneth Over" with her family and 
found it particularly objectionable. In response, she pressured the 
producers of the show and the Fox network into dropping a few 
particularly offensive shows. She also targeted the advertisers of the 
show and was successful in getting one advertiser to withdraw its 
support. 225 
On her own, Rakolta conducted the research necessary to 
discover the firms that advertised on Married ... with Children. If 
the FCC provided viewers with advertiser information in an easily 
accessible format---either on the Internet or during the show itself 
on a digital television guide-viewers with preferences weaker than 
Rokalta's could communicate their concerns. Advertisers and 
broadcast programmers could use this information in selecting 
desirable programming. 
C. The Legality of a Disclosure Regime 
The FCC has the authority to mandate that broadcasters provide 
information about advertisers who buy commercial time from them. 
The broad authority of § 303(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 
empowers the Commission to promulgate general rules for 
broadcasters and require recordkeeping.226 
Since virtually the beginning of broadcast regulation, the 
Commission has required broadcasters to keep information about its 
advertisers pursuant to its program log requirements. 227 Broadcasters 
maintained detailed records, available for inspection by the public 
224. A Mother Is Heard as Sponsors Abandon a TV Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1989, at AI. 
225. Id. 
226. 47 U.S.C. § 303(j) (2000) (stating that the Commission shall "[h]ave authority to 
make general rules and regulations requiring stations to keep such records of programs, 
transmissions of energy, communications, or signals as it may deem desirable"). 
227. The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 94 
F.C.C.2d 678, 687-88 (1983) (citing General Order No. 106, 5 FRC Ann. Report 96 
(1931)). 
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and the FCC, indicating commercials' "sponsors. . along with the 
time devoted to the commercial matter in question. ,,228 
While the program log requirements were largely lifted in the 
early 1980s,229 the FCC still has authority, pursuant to the above-
mentioned statutory sections and the broad public trustee 
obligation, to require broadcasters to submit advertiser information. 
The FCC could provide this information to consumers in a variety of 
low-cost ways. For example, the FCC could collect this information 
and provide it in a useful form on the Internet, suitable for easy 
computer search.230 
As discussed in the following Section, in order for mandated 
information disclosure to be efficient, the costs of providing the 
information must be sufficiently low. Requiring the FCC to provide 
advertiser information on the Internet would satisfY this 
requirement. Both the FCC's costs in providing this information and 
consumers' costs in accessing it would be low. Consumers could visit 
the FCC website and, with a relatively simple search, discover which 
advertisers buy time on which programs across the country. Such 
information would empower consumers to support those programs 
and advertisers they find acceptable and punish those advertisers who 
support programs they find objectionable. 
Posting the information during airtime would likely be too 
expensive, but with the widespread adoption of digital television in 
the next decade, many viewers will have access to digital, real-time 
television guides, known as electronic program guides. These guides 
allow viewers, with a few remote-control clicks, to access information 
about the programs they are watching. The FCC could certainly 
require inclusion of advertiser information on these guides. 
228. Petition for Rulemaking To Require Broad. Licensee To Maintain Certain Program 
Records, 44 F.C.C.2d 845, 847, 'll 8 (1974). The programming log rules are found at 47 
C.F.R. §§ 73.670, 73.674 (2004) (broadcast); id. §§ 73.112, 73.116 (radio AM specific 
rules); id. §§ 73.282,73.286 (radio FM specific rules). 
229. See The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 
F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984); Deregulation bf Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981) (eliminating 
program log requirements for radio). 
230. The FCC has proven its ability to provide the public with large amounts of 
information in useful formats. The Taubman Center for Public Policy at Brown University and 
a team of researchers examined 1265 state and federal websites and found the FCC's to be the 
best. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Website Ranked First in Federal 
Government (Sept. 18,2002). 
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D. Specifics of Disclosure Regime 
The general proposal to include advertisers in the FCC's 
indecency enforcement can be implemented in a variety of specific 
ways. This Article does not advocate one specific implementation 
method over another. Instead, it considers two different ways the 
FCC could acknowledge the two-sided nature of media markets and 
leaves the implementation method to policy makers: replacement or 
supplementary. 
First, the information regime could completely replace the 
current enforcement regime. The FCC would get out of the business 
of issuing notices of apparent liability and leave the job completely to 
the market. The FCC would simply have an informational-regulatory 
role, mandating disclosure and providing the data about each 
program's advertisers. Given that broadcasters make their money 
from selling airtime, broadcasters' records of commercial sales would 
be relatively easy to produce. The FCC could provide this 
information on the Internet or possibly mandate its inclusion on 
electronic program guides so that it could be available at the push of 
a remote control button. The high costs of tracking advertisers on 
the thousands of television channels and radio stations continuously 
broadcasting in the United States would be prohibitive to most 
individuals. Mandated disclosure would clearly lower information 
costs. 
Second, rather than replacing the FCC's enforcement regime, 
the informational regime could simply supplement the current 
regime, allowing both economic and political approaches to 
indecency regulation. The FCC would then continue its enforcement 
regIme while simultaneously providing and disseminating 
information. 
How a policy maker would implement the proposal would turn 
upon his or her willingness to embrace market forces and the value 
he or she placed on regulatory enforcements. Indeed, market forces 
would not necessarily be a panacea. Even though the mandatory 
disclosure regime would no doubt reduce transaction and 
information costs, the regime would still face considerable collective 
action problems and challenges. Further, just as the political process 
1503 
HeinOnline -- 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1504 2005
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
can be captured by particular special interests, advertisers could be 
similarly captured or, at least, intimidated.231 
On the other hand, advertisers are perhaps more resistant to 
cooption by a small group than politicians. Advertisers seek to reach 
the greatest number of people who might be interested in their 
product. If this involves advertising on programs potentially offensive 
to some individuals, the firm may not advertise, particularly if those 
individuals are well organized. However, the firm may still advertise 
if its target audience is greater than those consumers it offends. In 
the end, the market limits the effectiveness of anyone interest group 
because the costs of ignoring the median preferences are too great. 
Politicians, on the other hand, can respond to small interest groups 
almost exclusively because, if the median preference is sufficiently 
indifferent to small interest groups' concerns, there is no cost. 
Neither a regulatory enforcement nor mandated information 
disclosure regime is perfect. This Article does not maintain that an 
information regime will perfectly mirror community standards. At 
the very least, however, it will improve the process by making it 
more responsive to consumers and less responsive to special interest 
groups. 
E. Efficiency and Mandated Disclosure 
There are three generally accepted legal rationales behind FCC 
broadcast regulation.232 First, courts rationalized government 
regulation because of the scarcity of broadcast spectra. For instance, 
the Supreme Court has stated that "[ u ]nlike other modes of 
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique 
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is 
subject to governmental regulation. ,,233 Second, academics and the 
FCC have claimed that broadcast inherently tends towards 
monopoly or oligopoly.234 Third, academics and the FCC have 
231. See Mike Moffatt, The Logic of Collective Action, ABOUT.COM, 
http://economics.about.com/cs/macroeconomics/a/logic_oCaction.htm (quoting MANCUR 
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTNEAcTION 3 (1971)). 
232. MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: 
CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST 28, 43-45 (1986). 
233. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,226 (1943). 
234. See SPITZER, supra note 232, at 28. 
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argued that broadcast regulation promotes First Amendment values 
through widespread access to media outlets.235 
Another benefit of broadcast regulation that the courts, the 
FCC, and legal scholars have overlooked is the possibility that 
regulation could be efficiency enhancing by reducing transaction 
costs. The proposed regulation would reduce the costs to individuals 
of discovering and contacting the firms that advertise on 
objectionable programs. This general principle is fairly 
straightforward. Economic efficiency improves with increased 
information; in other words, people will receive more utility if they 
have greater knowledge about their purchases and actions. 
In this situation, disclosure requirements have the potential to 
increase efficiency by increasing the amount of information 
consumers have when making viewing decisions. To the degree that 
individuals would not watch a show if it were supported by 
advertisers that supported objectionable programming, individuals' 
choices will be better with more information. The more individuals 
know about what programs advertisers support, the closer their 
viewing (and buying) behavior will match their preferences-the 
standard definition of efficiency. Thus, in the same way that 
government-mandated labeling improves efficient purchases in salad 
dressing,236 or that disclosure under the securities laws encourages 
efficient investment,237 labeling and disclosure of advertisers will 
encourage efficient media markets. Information disclosure avoids the 
difficulty faced by the current regime of trying to discern a 
"community standard" based only on preferences of who filed 
complaints. The market also has the advantage of more constant 
monitoring, as individuals have the incentive to evaluate quality on a 
continuing basis. 
235. See id. at 43--45 (citing Lee Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward 
a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976)). 
236. See Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Product Choices: A11 
Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 672 (2000) (demonstrating how 
mandatory labeling affects consumer choice and leads to the purchase of more low-fat salad 
dressing). 
237. Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Temporal 
and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1044, 1044 (2005) ("The fundamental goal of 
securities law is to make markets more efficient by providing transparency to investors, thereby 
reducing asymmetric information. "). 
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Theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that 
disclosure improves efficiency.238 For instance, government-
mandated labeling has been shown to decrease fat levels in salad 
dressing. 239 Arguably, once consumers knew more about what they 
were buying, they used their collective bargaining power to get more 
of what they wanted-salad dressing that still tastes good, but has 
less fat. 240 
On the other hand, one may wonder why, if the efficiency gains 
of disclosure are so manifest, the market does not already provide 
this information. Economists have pointed out that consumers have 
strong economic incentives to gather information and, conversely, 
"sellers have a substantial economic incentive to disseminate 
information to consumers. ,,241 Given the generally accepted 
definition of efficiency in the information market as requiring 
equality between the expected marginal social benefits and the 
marginal cost of information gathering or information provision-
where the marginal social benefit of the information includes the 
increment to consumer surplus plus the gain in sellers' net 
revenues-then mandated disclosure runs the risk of being inefficient 
on two grounds: (1) government mandates may provide more than 
the optimal amount of information or (2) the cost of government-
mandated information may exceed the efficiency gams the 
information induces.242 
Beales, Craswell, and Salop identifY features in markets that 
might result in a sub-optimal amount of information.243 First, they 
point to the "public good" property of information: while 
information helps everyone, its benefits are difficult to capture, at 
least entirely, by the firm that expended the cost to produce it.244 
This suggests that information will be under-produced generally in 
an otherwise competitive information market. 245 
238. See THOMAS E. COPLAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND 
CORPORATE POLICY 196-215 (1st ed. 1976). 
239. Mathias, supra note 236, at 665. 
240. See id. 
241. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of 
Consumer Information, 25 J.L. & ECON. 491, 502 (1981). 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 503-13. 
244. Id. at 503. 
245. Steve Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 240 
(1976). 
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The public-good property of advertising is an example of this 
problem. Precisely how would a broadcaster provide information 
about all advertisers? To be effective, the broadcaster would have to 
use broadcast airtime otherwise devoted to advertising-a clear 
monetary loss. Whatever gains it would have, however, would go to 
all broadcasters. Thus, anyone broadcaster would have a decreased 
incentive to provide such information in a competitive environment. 
Further, even if a broadcaster did provide information, it would also 
experience free-rider problems, as other broadcasters would no 
longer have an incentive to provide information, thus leaving one 
broadcaster with all the cost and only some of the benefit. 
Media markets tend to encourage producer output that caters to 
average tastes. Consider the following. Assume there are three 
available programs-a baseball game, an opera, and a play-and 
three types of viewers. Further assume that 1,000 viewers like the 
baseball game, 200 viewers like the opera, and 100 viewers like the 
play. Finally, assume there are three channels. Peter Steiner famously 
indicated that producers cater to the average taste. 246 For example, 
three competitors would all duplicate the baseball game, because the 
baseball game could attract 333 viewers for each of the three 
channels, which is more than the 200 viewers that would watch an 
opera or the 100 viewers that would watch a play.247 
Mandating disclosure of additional information about advertising 
would create smaller audiences for any given program. For example, 
it is possible that 1,000 viewers would watch the baseball game, 
ignorant of its advertisers. Suppose, however, that 990 viewers would 
watch the baseball game if they knew that an advertising sponsor of 
the baseball game, say Gillette, also advertised on the Howard Stern 
Show. A monopolistic firm would have to put on two baseball 
games-one sponsored by Gillette and the other sponsored by 
advertisers acceptable to the offended ten viewers-in order to 
capture these viewers. Thus, the added information simply adds cost 
to the firm without necessarily increasing viewership. 
Indeed, this same mechanism might also prevent the industry as 
a whole, through trade associations like the National Association of 
246. Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of 
Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952). 
247. Id. at 217. Steiner's discussion of listener maximization formed the basis for the 
baseball analogy in the text. 
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Broadcasters, from providing such information. Advertising 
information would have the tendency to decrease viewership for any 
particular program. In order to retain viewership, broadcasters would 
need to show two baseball games with acceptable advertisers to two 
groups of viewers-rather than one baseball game which would have 
been acceptable to all without the advertiser information. Thus, 
industry-wide advertising would likely simply raise costs without 
increasing viewership. Clearly, there would be no incentive for 
industry groups to engage in such a campaign. Given the market 
incentive to produce too little information about advertisers, 
government mandated disclosure-particularly the low cost one 
advocated for here-would be appropriate. 
F. Better Reflection of Community Standards and Preferences 
Further, a market-based approach would better reflect a regional 
community's standards in comparison to the FCC's single national 
standard. The Commission uses a community standard that is not 
region-specific but reflects "an average broadcast viewer or listener" 
in the United States.248 It is not clear why the FCC adopts a national 
standard when the Supreme Court accepts a regional approach for 
obscenity;249 certainly, the FCC would be constitutionally permitted 
to adopt a regional approach. Further, the current FCC's attempts to 
define a national community standard are confounded by this 
country's large geographical and cultural diversity. 
Of course, a regional approach to indecency regulation would be 
a tremendous administrative burden. While it is fairly uncontroversial 
that community standards are quite different in the Castro district of 
San Francisco than in suburban Salt Lake City, defining these 
differences in a useful way for workable administrative standards 
would require a massive sociological inquiry and legal effort. Given 
the vagueness of the indecency standard itself, such an inquiry might 
be impossible. It is certainly beyond the resources of the FCC. 
On the other hand, a market-based approach to indecency 
regulation could easily enforce more localized standards. Given that 
radio and television spectrums are locally licensed, advertisements on 
248. 2001 Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 8002 (2001). 
249. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573-75 (2002) (discussing the "community 
standard," which seems to imply a regional approach). 
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many broadcasts are locally bought and sold.250 Advertisers, 
therefore, could withhold support for programs that would be 
indecent or otherwise objectionable in suburban Salt Lake City, but 
hardly risque in San Francisco. Further, nationally purchased 
advertising could be tailored to different localities. 
Unlike the current, centralized FCC approach that dictates 
"community standards" from inside the Beltway, which often reflects 
political compromise or signaling between politicians and special 
interests, a market-based approach would more likely reflect 
communities' tastes and preferences. Also, unlike bureaucrats and 
FCC political appointees, who have a clear incentive to cater to 
political and industry interests, advertisers would have a clear 
economic incentive to avoid sponsoring programs that would offend 
a significant portion of their community'S viewing audience. Such a 
result enhances efficiency because advertisers would have the 
incentive to respond to real preferences, not simply bureaucratic 
approximated guesses or political compromises purporting to reflect 
community preferences. 
G. Civic Society and Community Standards 
The current FCC regulatory approach deters civic involvement in 
important community decisions. Numerous political scientists and 
legal scholars, often identified as civic republicans, evaluate laws and 
political systems for the extent to which they encourage or 
discourage discussion of important issues and widespread, broad-
based involvement in political dialogue. 251 It is thought that such a 
dialogue will help clarity the basic principles of society, improve 
those principles, and, perhaps more importantly, produce better 
citizens. In other words, through continued meaningful involvement 
in politics, we graduate, so to speak, from the sordid squabbles of 
high school student government into the organic, profound political 
reflection that elevates both the state and the individual. 
Regardless of one's views on civic republicanism, it is clear that 
the current regulatory approach towards obscenity retards the 
250. Advertisers contract, therefore, in large part with the local broadcast stations, or at 
the very least, on a regional level. 
251. See Frank 1. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4, 17-19 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 31 (1985). 
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development of civic society and civic republican virtues. What is 
particularly striking about the decency standards is that although 
they purport to reflect community standards, they are more often 
about Beltway politics and legal arguments. Individuals and 
individual communities have little input into decency standards in 
their communities. Rather, communities tend to sit back and simply 
wait and see whether the FCC will take action against a particular 
shock jock or enjoy the spectacle of politicians falling over each other 
to denounce Janet Jackson in the most vociferous manner. 
A market-based approach, on the other hand, would encourage 
and empower a discussion about what community standards should 
be for broadcast. It would lower the costs for the would-be Terry 
Rakolta. More people would be able to pressure producers and 
present arguments to their fellow citizens about the benefits and 
costs of more restrictive broadcast indecency rules. Those who enjoy 
Married . .. with Children could present their arguments about why 
the show is worthy of advertiser support and those who oppose it 
could do the same. This is precisely the type of discussion about 
indecency that our civic discourse lacks. 
H. Cost of Disclosure 
Finally, any benefits of this regime must be balanced against its 
costs. Regulation that is so costly that it outweighs its benefits 
generally cannot be defended. Here, the cost is minimal. As 
discussed above, broadcasters already keep track of program 
advertisers.252 The FCC would merely have to require that this 
information be made available on the Internet and perhaps provide a 
master webpage to assist people in finding particular local 
broadcasters. 
1. Beyond Indecency 
Currently, the FCC indecency regulation prohibits only indecent 
material (i.e., material that involves sexual or excretory organs ).253 
Many believe that other types of programming, particularly violent 
252. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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programming, has a negative effect on children, yet the FCC has no 
authority to directly regulate violent content.254 
The closest the FCC has come to regulating violence is the 1996 
Telecommunications Act mandate that V-chips be installed in all 
television sets "shipped in interstate commerce or manufactured in 
the United States.,,255 These chips can read ratings embedded in 
programming content and screen out programs with ratings viewers 
do not want to see. Thus, if a program identifies itself as having 
more violence than the amount set by the viewer, it will be blocked. 
Due to First Amendment concerns, the Act did not mandate that 
broadcasters label their programming; rather, Congress encouraged 
them to do SO.256 
The V-chip's effectiveness has been questionable. As Thomas 
Hazlett wrote, "[T]he joke has always been that mom and dad will 
be unable to deploy any filtering device that requires programming 
skills without persuading their 10-year old to show them how.,,257 
Moreover, a recent study by the Annenberg Center suggests that the 
overwhelming majority of families would not use the V-chip even if 
given extensive technical support.258 
This Article's approach provides another mechanism for 
advocates of violence regulation-a mechanism that allows 
consumers to put pressure directly on content producers and does 
not rely on individuals' abilities to program their VCRs and TIVOs. 
J. Response to Objection 
An objection immediately arises from this Article's proposal. 
Civil libertarians might object because it gives too much power to 
specific groups of consumers. Particular groups, say armies of Terry 
Rakoltas and organizations like Morality in Media, might be 
254. See KEVIN w. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
146-63 (2003). 
255. 47 u.s.c. § 303(x) (2000). (requiring that an apparatus designed to receive 
television signals should be equipped with a feature "designed to enable viewers to block 
display of all programs with a common rating" ). 
256. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1490, 1544 n.294 (2005). 
257. Thomas Hazlett, Requiem for the V-Chip: A Relic of the Last Battle over Indecency on 
TV, SLATE, Feb. 13,2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2095396. 
258. AMy JORDAN & EMORY WOODARD, PARENTS' USE OF THE V-CHIP To SUPERVISE 
CHILDREN'S TELEVISION USE (The Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2003), available at 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/05_media_developin~child/childrensprogram 
ming/2003_Parentsuseofvchip.pdf. 
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empowered to limit or eliminate types of programming enjoyed by 
minorities of the viewing public. Thus, the proposal would decrease 
media diversity and arguably censor speech. 
This· criticism rings hollow, however, because the market already 
censors speech. As A.I. Liebling quipped, "[FJreedom of the press is 
guaranteed only to those who own one. ,,259 A basic truth in our 
society is that those who own a media outlet determine the content 
of broadcast programming. Conversely, to the degree that the media 
properties are valuable assets, their owners will generally select 
programming that maximizes profits derived from such assets. 
As discussed in Section V, broadcasters that wish to maximize 
profit often have an incentive to cater to average tastes. Presumably, 
this does not violate civil libertarian principles. Indeed, the civil 
libertarian objection goes too far because, taken to its logical 
extension, it would prohibit private ownership of media. Rather, this 
Article's proposal merely advances more efficient functioning in the 
media market, which civil libertarians generally accept, despite its 
potential to reduce programming diversity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The history of recent indecency enforcement is the story of 
politicization of legal standards. The FCC has not only failed to 
promulgate clear standards, it has muddied the waters with 
haphazard interpretations and enforcements. Delegating authority to 
administrative agencies always carries risk of politicization and 
slanted enforcement, but these risks are particularly undesirable when 
First Amendment values are on the line. Moreover, when the law is 
unclear, broadcasters will err on the side of caution, self-censoring 
perfectly legal speech. 
This Article suggests a new approach to indecency regulation 
that seeks to enhance efficiency on a side of the media market that 
regulators have previously ignored-the viewer-advertiser 
relationship-by lowering information costs for viewers. Such 
information-based regulation holds the promise of providing 
decency standards that are more genuinely reflective of local 
community standards than the FCC's national community standard. 
Further, the proposed regime could be responsive to other 
259. Abbott Joseph Liebling, Do You Belong in Journalism?, NEW YORKER, May 4, 1960. 
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objectionable, potentially damaging material, such as violent 
programming, that present FCC regulations largely ignore. The 
proposed regulation has minimal costs and would simply involve a 
wider dissemination of information about advertisers and 
programming-information that broadcasters already record and 
track. Dissemination of this information could be made on the 
Internet easily and cheaply. Finally, this proposal would return the 
debate about community standards to the people, empowering them 
to carry on the public discussion, rather than enabling an agency 
with its too often politicized discretion. 
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